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ABSTRACT
SARAH LYNN KARP: Remembering al-Andaliis
Collective Memory and Hispano-Muslim Relations in Southern Spain
(Under the direction of Ahmet Yukleyen)

This paper concerns the negotiation of the medieval history of Islamic Spain for
the purposes of identity creation and Muslim minority integration in Andalucia. The
argument challenges essentialist hypotheses positing that history is absolute and
demonstrates ‘innate’ characteristics of a culture. It provides an example of a contested
national past which involves both periods of conflict and periods of peaceful coexistence.
Many of the sources used are original language media sources, including newspaper
articles, organization websites, and government documents. Interviews, data, and analysis
gathered by Gema Martm-Muhoz, Gunther Dietz, Bebee Bahrami, and Nadia elShohoumi are used in conjunction with interviews gathered in Granada, Spain, by the
author. The project’s findings expose a situation in which the past is being negotiated to
find common ground amongst the actors to benefit both the minority Muslim population
and the Catholic/Secular Spanish population of Andalucia. It provides examples of
situations when this negotiation was successful in integrating the minority and examples
in which this is an unresolved process. This paper provides a hypothesis for why Spain,
as the only Western European country intertwined with Islamic civilization, has shown a
tolerance for Muslim religious communities, despite having come into intense conflict
with them in the twenty-first century.
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Introduction
Since World War II western Europe has undergone a major demographic shift.
Postwar reconstruction required labor which was supplied by ex-colonies and areas
where unemployment was high. Most immediately affected by this shift were Great
Britain, taking on immigrants from Pakistan and the Middle East, Germany, taking on
immigrants from Turkey, and France, whose migrants came primarily from Maghreb
countries Algeria and Morocco. Migrants tended to leave their countries of origin either
as part of guest worker programs, as refugees, or in search of education. Spain became a
“sending” rather than a receiving country. Many Spaniards left Francoist Spain seeking
work in France, Switzerland, and Germany during the 1950s and 1960s. It was not until
the 1970s, heralded by the economic turnaround dubbed the ‘ Spanish Miracle, and the
death of General Francisco Franco in 1975 that the tide of immigrants suddenly turned.
Immigrants from Morocco were the main newcomers, arriving from across the straits of
Gibraltar. The continued presence of Muslims throughout Europe has taken on a new
importance concerning the rise in radical Islam and terrorist acts in Great Britain and
Spain.
The presence of Muslims in Europe is today studied as a recent phenomenon.
However, the Spanish case gives us an example of a peaceful Muslim presence in
Western Europe, though it is buried centuries in the past. Spain s history is intertwined
with the Islamic world. In 71 Ic.e., Muslim armies crossed the straits to quickly conquer
most of the peninsula by the end of the century. Great cities were established in Sevilla,
Cordoba, Granada, Toledo, Salamanca, and Zaragoza. Jews and Christians who chose not
to convert were allowed to continue their religious traditions. The empire even cultivated
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great centers of inter-religious learning, especially in the translation centers of Toledo
and Salamanca. Philosophers, artists, mathematicians, and scientists of all three faiths
enjoyed the amount of freedom afforded them under the Caliphate. This period, known as
la convivencuu which can be translated as “The Coexistence,’ waxed and waned
throughout the 800 years of Islamic rule on the peninsula.’
The final bastion of Islam in Spain, Granada, was conquered in 1492. Despite
agreements with the then-rulers of Spain, Muslims and Jews were ruthlessly persecuted
and finally expelled from the peninsula in the subsequent 200 years. Spain was united
under the Catholic Kings, Ferdinand and Isabelle, and would enter into her Golden Age.
The impact of the Islamic world on the peninsula, however, could not be forgotten.
Enormous fortresses, bath houses, and mosques were preserved. The Arabic language had
so influenced the Vulgar Latin spoken there that over 1000 words were adapted into the
vernacular." Nevertheless, the memory of convivencia faded in favor of heroic tales about
brave Catholic knights such as El Cid, Guzman al Bueno, and Santiago Matamoros
(Moor-killer) who slaughtered heretics and reclaimed Spain for Catholicism during la
reconqiiista, that supported the domination of the Catholic hierarchy in Spain.
Throughout this paper I argue that this past has a marked impact on Muslim
integration in southern Spain. This viewpoint challenges essentialist assumptions that
cultures and civilizations may only be understood by examining history.^ As we see in
the case of Spain, the past is actually contested, providing examples of both peaceful

' While it is true that some discrimination was practiced towards the religious minorities, like being
required to pay high taxes, there is actually little evidence ot forced conversion. See Chris Lowney s
account in A Vanished World or Maria Rosa Menocal's The Ornament of the World: How Muslims.
Christians and Jew's Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain for more information.
■ Coates, Mary Weld. "The Arabic Element in Modern Spanish." Hispania 26.1 (Feb. 1943): 59-64.
'See Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizotions or What Went Wronfi.’ By Bernard Lewis.
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coexistence and periods of conflict. What becomes important in the case of Spain is how
the past is negotiated in the modem context. The past is only made relevant in this
contextual interpretation. As the research shows, both Muslims and non-Muslim
Spaniards are engaged in this negotiation. Although motivations may differ, when their
interests overlap, space is created in which Muslims can be integrated into the larger
society. This process has become more important with the ever-increasing visibility of
Muslim immigrants, who today number more than 800,000."* According to the “Muslim
Census” conducted in 2007 by the Islamic Commission of Spain, there are 1,145,424
Muslims currently living in the country.^
I have used mostly primary, original language sources to find out how the past is
negotiated to form this identity. Spanish newspapers follow this issue closely. I utilize
media sources considered more leftist (El Pais, El Mundo), more conservative(ABC),
and local Granada newspapers such as Ideal and online source Granada Digital in an
attempt to represent the full range of political leanings represented by Spanish media. I
also present evidence from government documents dictating the structure of social
services and religious representational bodies, regional education reforms, and personal
interviews and observations gathered during my time in Granada.
The project is divided into four chapters which describe and analyze the use of the
past for the purposes of identity formation in Andalucia. The basic method is deductive,
as much of the negotiation of the past is not done consciously. Explicit references to the
past can be found, but often must be teased out from the context. The first chapter

^ Agrita, Elena. "Representing Islam in Spain; Muslim Identities and the Contestation of Leadership." The
Muslim World 96(Oct. 2006): 56.'^-584.
^ ComisuSn Islamica de Espana. Comision Islamicj de E.>paha. 23 Apr. 200X
<htip;//www gcocilies.fom/gabijairo/promo/cic.htm>.
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describes the context in which Spanish Muslims are developing their identities. It
addresses the situations of the Muslim converts, immigrant Muslims, and the official
organizations that represent them. This chapter identifies the motivations of each group
and their interest in negotiating the past. The distinctions are important because this
group is not homogenous, causing representational and organizational problems on the
local and national levels, and altering public perception of Islam from place to place. The
second chapter focuses on the construction of identity in Andalucia, beginning with Bias
Infante and his Andalucismo movement and the impact of nationalism on the
development of collective memory through the historical naiTative promoted by the state.
This chapter discusses the use of that memory in education. The third chapter presents
two public venues in which the Islamic past of Spain is contested: the Moros y Cristianos
festivals and the debate over religious use of the Mosque-Cathedral of Cordoba.
Arguments from both secular/Catholic Spaniards and Muslims are presented, which
frequently call on reinterpretations of the past. The final chapter examines the economic
necessity of Muslims throughout Andalucia with a focus on Granada, and analyzes the
development of what I have found to be a sort of symbiotic relationship between tourism
and Spanish-Muslim identity. This provides an example of overlapping interests which
results in the creation of a space for integration.

4

Chapter 1
The Disjointed Umma in Context
To understand the developing collective memory of both Muslim and nonMuslim Andalucians, we must understand the context in which these groups have
established their presence. After discussing the major characteristics of different
groupings of Muslims, this chapter examines the structures of the organizations which
represent them, including the major mosques in Andalucia and the umbrella organizations
they align with. This contextual understanding will reveal the flexibility of identity
formation and the re-imagination of the past’s role. This chapter therefore focuses on how
convert Muslims legitimize their presence in the region, specifically through the
reinterpretation of the past, and how immigrant Muslims have carved out roles in their
new environment.
Unfortunately, this is no easy task. The umma^ of Andalucia is anything but
homogenous. The main divide is between the convert population (concentrated in cities
of historical significance in Andalucia) and immigrants, mostly from North African
countries although with a minority from Senegal, Pakistan, and others from the Middle
East. The immigrants are divided further still by ethnicity. Arabs, Berbers, and Pakistanis
do not practice in the same mamier, following different schools of law and varying
degrees of daily practice beyond self-identification as “Muslim.” Immigrants from mral
and urban areas can be found, as well as those with university degrees and those with no
more than a few years of high school education. For the most part, they do work in
similar sectors, especially in Andalucia. As far as labor patterns are concerned, immigrant

A traditional Arabic term referring to the global community of Muslims connected through taith.
supposedly transcending national, ethnic, even sectarian divides.
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Muslims tend to work either in the agricultural sector, often as seasonal labor, or in
construction near major cities.
The Union of Islamic Communities in Spain(UCIDE)claims that there are
between 5 and 10 thousand converts in Spain, noting that if the children of converts and
mixed couples are included, the number is around 68,000.^ Though they constitute only a
small minority population in Spain, converts are in the forefront of efforts to construct an
Andalucian identity. This has been an ongoing process which began with the arrival of
the charismatic Murabitun movement, which gained momentum in the 1980s through the
Society for the Return of Islam to Spain. Its origins and continued presence in Andaluci'a
is intentional, representing an attempt to re-establish Islam in the land once called alAndalus by the ruling Muslims. This movement, headed by Shayk Abdalqadir as-Sufi, a
convert originally from Scotland, is known for its tightly-knit and well-connected
communities of adherents. The doctrine espoused by the group includes an anti
globalization, leftist economic ideology and a supposedly purely “Quaranic”
interpretation of Islam, therefore it does not follow a specific school of Islamic law. This
is very important to many converts, who see their interpretation of Islam as more pure
than the Islam practiced by immigrants, whom they consider to be influenced by their
native country’s culturally imbedded Islam. One of the largest Murabit communities
exists in Granada, where more than 200 Spaniards belong to the sect.^ There are Murabit
Islamic centers or mosques in Cordoba and Sevilla as well.

^ Francisco Alonso. Juan. "Conversos: Vidas de moros nuevos." ABC 7 Jan. 2007.
Athena Intelligence. "El Movimiento Mundial Murabitun en Espana." Athena PaperlA (Oct. 2007). 3
Mar. 2008 <http://www.athenaintelligence.org/opa20.pdf>.
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The converts are more concerned with justifying their presence, with legitimizing
a place for themselves in society, than are the immigrants. Organizations like Comunidad
Islamica en Espaha(CIE), the Murabit umbrella organization, and FEERI, the branch of
the national Islamic Council which represents most of the convert mosques in Spain,
demand recognition with an (almost) unified voice, feeling entitled to it after one
thousand years of “exile” of their Muslim brethren. In calling upon the past, they cannot
ignore the present. In Andalucia, there is little mixing between convert and immigrant
populations in religious practice (with the notable exception of A1 Taqwa Mosque in
Granada, which will be discussed later in this chapter). Many convert mosques do hire
foreign imams, but this appears to be where the mixing ends, leaving the convert and
immigrant Muslims poorly integrated with one another.
Each of the 39 mosques in Andalucia has its own flavor. Granada is a magnet
for convert activity and public displays of identity, particularly in the Albaicin, an old
Moorish neighborhood. In Granada, ethnicity, nationality, and Islamic school of law
divide the attendees of the six mosques there. The mosques generally attract distinctive
groups to service.
Converts and Murabitun Leadership
Although the converts of Andalucia tend to have relocated from more urban areas
of Spain and from other western European countries (notably Great Britain and
Gennany), they form a fairly homogenous group that functions in a recognizably
different manner from the immigrant community. The group is large, affluent, and more
familiar with local culture and government functions (not to mention proficient in
Ohservatorio Andalusi. "Informe 2006." FEERI. 2006. Institucion para la observacion y seguimiento de la
situacidn del ciudadano niusulman y la islamofobia en Espana. 2 Mar. 2008
<http://www.feeri.info/oservalorio/OSERVATORIO.index.htm>.
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Spanish). Mobilization of the convert community is therefore easier within the frame of
Andalucian society and channels of communication are more accessible. In fact, “those
people engaged in representing the 1 Islamic] community are most often sympathetic
secular or Catholic Spaniards or Spanish converts to Islam, who often do not share
religious and political attitudes or life experiences with immigrants,

10

Although the

converts represent a minority of the Muslim population, they are nevertheless significant
because of their high levels of activity and visibility.
The converts are also highly conscious of the action of identity construction, and
use their new religion as a means to separate themselves from the Catholic community. In
this attempt, many converts, especially amongst the Murabit community, also isolate
themselves from the immigrant Muslim community. The distinction is intentional, as
the converts simultaneously express “The personal experience of conversion... as an act
of ‘liberation’ from [Spanish-Catholic] tradition’

12

while attempting to retain European

traditions and, for the most part, patterns of social organization. They seek recognition as
a native population of Muslims, distinct from both Catholic and secular traditions and
from the arriving immigrant communities.
Additionally, the revival of the past plays a major role in the establishment of
convert communities in Andalucia. The reconstruction of the medieval history takes two
seemingly contradictory forms. Both methods use history to legitimize the convert
presence in Andalucia. The first, common among younger converts “searching for

Rogozen-Soltar. Mikaela. "Al-Andalus in Andalusia: Negotiating Moorish History and Regional Identity
in Southern Spain." Anthropological Quarterly 80.3 (2007): 863-886.
'' See a discussion of the opposing viewpoints of immigrant and convert Muslims regarding education on
5age 36 and the representative divide in chapter two.
■ Dietz. Gunther, and Nadia El-Shohoumi. Muslim Women in Southern Spain: Stepdaughters of AlAndalus. I.a Jolla. California: Center for Comparative Immigration Studies. 2005. p 26.
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something hip and bohemian,” tends to emphasize the “recreation” of convivencia,
13

valuing tolerance and universality above all.

The historic presence of Islam on the

peninsula, which is frequently emphasized as peaceful among this first group, tends to
have a great impact on the decision to convert. Bahrami mentions that several converts
she interviewed emphasized that had there never been an al-Andalus, they never would
14

have converted.

In the other use of history, some converts express anger or bitterness

regarding the treatment of medieval Muslims following the reconquista, as is evident
from the inteipretations of the Capitulations of Granada espoused by the Murabit-run
Grand Mosque of Granada. The universality embraced by new converts is contradicted
by the Murabit sense that their followers are the elite of the umma,the “only ones
capable of improving the situation of the rest of the Muslims, all of whom are on the
15

wrong path.
Higher education seems to be a common factor among converts. Many are
university educated and from middle to upper class families. Bahrami mentions a convert
discussing her conversion to Islam as “the most natural evolution for any man or woman.
Islam is the most highly evolved and coiTect path, it is a natural process for any
intelligent person to finally see it and come to it.” Interestingly, the interviewee seems to
emphasize the ‘intelligence’ associated with the process of conversion. The high
concentration of university educated men and women in Andalucia, especially in the
province of Granada, is partly due to the acclaimed Universidad de Granada, which

Bahrami. Beebe."A Do(m to Paradise: Converts, the New Age, Islam, and the Past in Granada. Spain.
Cin- and Society 10(1998): 121-132.
Ibid, p 127
Athena Intelligence. "El Movimiento Mundial Murabitiin en Espaha." Athena Intelligence: Red de
Investigacion Avanzada en Insurgencia y Tenorismo 2.4 (Oct. 2007). 21 Mar. 2008
<http;//www alhenaintelligence.org/opa20.pdt’>.
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attracts many students from abroad as well as Spain itself. The university is home to
nearly 60,000 students, according to Dietz and Al- Shohoumi.‘^ Many converts are those
who have come to Granada for education, and stayed to join the convert community
Spanish nationals make up a large portion of the convert community, but there are
also Germans, British, and Americans among them. The founder of the Grand Mosque of
Granada, Shayk Abdalqadir as-Sufi, is the former Ian Dallas of Scotland, while
Abdulhasib Castineira (director of the mosque) is a convert from Galicia, in northern
Spain. Members of the Murabitun sect, followers of Shayk Abdalqadir as-Sufi, make up
the majority of the converts in Granada and Cordoba, where Abdalqadir began his
movement in Spain after emigrating from Great Britain in the 1970s. Although the
Murabit community only contains 200 formal members in Granada, El Pais estimates
between 1000 and 1500 adherents gather in the Grand Mosque on Fridays to hear Imam
Sidi Muhammad bin Mubarak Al Kassibi Al Sousi offer Friday prayers.17
Abdalqadir’s movement is classified as a brand of Sufism, although some critics
have characterized it as a syncretic cult only tangentially related to Quranic Islam, from
which they argue Abdalqadir has simply chosen certain elements and grafted them onto
an ideology based ... in anti-Semitism and neo-Nazism.

18

This claim has arisen largely

from an oft-quoted speech in which he (allegedly) asserted that “Hitler was the century’s
19

only true mujahid.

Although he is popularly believed to be a neo-Nazi, the articles

posted on his website show no such signs. Frequent references to World War Two and

Dietz. Gunther, and Nadia El-Shohoumi. Muslim Women in Southern Spain: Stepdaughters ofAlAndalus. La Jolla. California: Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, 2005. p 16
Planelles. Manuel. "El islam crece a hurtadillas." El Pais 1 Jan. 2006.
Doubleday. Simon R.. and David Coleman. In the Light of Medieval Spain: Islam the West and the
Relevance of History. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming 2008.
A Muslim involved in a “true Jihad'
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the Holocaust have led to the characterization of Abdalqadir as being “totally fascinated
by the figure of Hitler."’'’ His website reveals a dedication to the rejection of the modem
constitutional democracy and capitalism.’' According to intelligence publications from
the coordinated Spanish and American efforts of Athena Intelligence, the use of false
paper money is described as the “greatest evil of the world”, attributed to a conspiratorial
->i
view of Jewish control over the world’s economic systems."

The Murabit

movement has been growing in popularity and visibility since the

early 1980s. when Abdalqadir first relocated to Granada from Cordoba and purchased
land overlooking the historic Alhambra palace at the top of the Albaicin with the
intention of building a Grand Mosque for Granada, the first since the destruction of the
Nazari’s mosque following the conquest of 1492. The extensive controversy was
unresolved until 2003 when the mosque was officially opened. According to Coleman,
“Murabitun followers publicized both within Spain and abroad the most extreme
statements of... opponents as evidence of the persecution under which they [Granadino
Muslims I lived” and in turn, reinforced their own isolation from the community at
large.“^
For the most

part, his convert followers are considered orthodox practitioners,

strictly adhering to codes of modesty and halal behavior.

24

Bahrami’s interviews with

20

Athena Intelligence. "El Movimiento Mundial Murabitun en Espana." Athena PaperlA (Oct. 2007). 3
Mar. 2008 <http://www.athenaintelligence.org/opa20.pdf>.
■' A.s-Sufi. Abdalqadir. The Website of Shaykh Dr. Abdalqadir as-Snfi. 15 Nov. 2007. 7 Dec. 2007
<http://www.shaykhabdalqadir.com/content/index.html>.
Athena Intelligence. "El Movimiento Mundial Murabitun en Espana." Athena Intelligence: Red de
Investigacion Avanzada en Insnrgencia y Terrorisino 2.4
(Oct. 2007). 21 Mar. 2008 <http://www.athenaintelligence.org/opa20.pdf>.
■' Doubleday. Simon R.. and David Coleman. In the Light of Medieval Spain: Islam, the West and the
Relevance of Histon . New York: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming 2008.
Arabic term meaning “prescribed.” it is the (Opposite of “haram.” or prohibited. Halal behaviors include
observation (d Friday Sabbath, not eating pig products, and not consuming alcohol.
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converts and immigrants in the Albaicin neighborhood of Granada uncovered the respect
the Murabitun hold for their immigrant compatriots, but emphasizes that their particular
inteipretation of Islam tends to isolate them from the majority of Muslims. The feeling of
having separated from the culture they were bom into as a conscious choice unites
converts from many different backgrounds. Many convert families adhere to sexsegregated traditions that are common in Muslim majority patriarchal cultures. This is
identified by Moroccans as a cultural, not a religious, aspect of their lives. Yet the
convert group insists that their interpretation is strictly Quranic, and is a “pure” Islam
removed from the cultural matrices from which immigrants come.“^ Although this
religious interpretation creates a more concrete community of converts, in practice it
isolates the group from the immigrant community, which, more often than not, seeks a
more “Spanish” social model of interaction. In reality, the shift to a Spanish model of
society is not difficult for Moroccan immigrants who come from a western-influenced
social system in which many men and women have adopted mixed sex lifestyles that are
very different from the traditionally separate sex spheres of interaction practiced by older
generations.
The Murabitun movement is very much alive and well in Cordoba also, running
under the auspices of “Junta Islamica” controlled by president Mansur Escudero. Junta
Islamica was an integral part of the since-disbanded “Sociedad para el retomo del Islam a
Espaha,” Shayk Abdalqadir As-Sufi’s original project in Spain. Although no longer
officially a part of the Murabit movement, the influences still linger and Escudero
continues to use his connections with that community in his functions as president of

Bahrami. Beebe."A Door lo Paradise: Converts, the New Age, Islam, and the Past in Granada. Spain.
Cir\ ami Soi ici\ I0( 199S): 121-1.^2.
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Junta Islamica. The split occurred in the mid 1980s."^ Although both groups continue to
espouse similarly leftist beliefs, Escudero's group is more open to government
interaction, taking part in the Islamic Commission(CIE)through FEERI. The ties to the
Murabit movement remain in basic beliefs, and it was from his seat as president of
FEERI that Escudero, and later his compatriot Abdelkarim Carrasco, exercised a
conservative religious (and leftist political) influence over FEERI, until 2006, when a
surprising election brought Felix Herrero, a convert with no connection to the Murabitun
movement, to the presidency.
Abdalqadir’s is not the only mosque in Granada, as much as reports abroad seem
to indicate through headlines as ^'Una mezqiiita para Granada"(a Mosque for Granada).
In fact, it is the first mosque built for such a purpose in Granada since 1492, but certainly
not the first established mosque in the city. In fact, there are currently fifteen prayer
houses and mosques within the province of Granada, ten in Seville, and four in Cordoba.
Each of these cities (notably historic cities in the al-Andalus past) has a link to the
Murabit movement through a community of organized converts. Each city is also home to
other, smaller groups of converts. Cordoba was the original home of the movement.
Sevilla has hosted a Murabit community since 1987, as “La Comunidad Islamica en
Sevilla." which works closely with the Comunidad Islamica en Espana, the Murabit
organ separate from the Islamic Council, UCIDE and FEERI."^ Construction on a mosque
for the community will begin this year. The projected completion date is 2010, and plans

26

Rodriguez Magda, Rosa Maria. Lm Espana Convertida al Islam. Barcelona: Altera, 2006.
C'hamorro. Sol Tarres. "Religiosidad Musulmana en Sevilla." Religion y Cnltura 1 { 1999): 199-208.
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have been approved which include a minaret. The plans have been spearheaded by none
other than president of the Grand Mosque of Granada, Malik Ruiz.“^
In Granada, Al-Taqwa Mosque (translated as “Fear of God” in Spanish
newspapers), located in a restored building near Plaza Nueva, in la Calderia Nueva, also
known as "el hcijo alhoicin'(lower Albaicin), is a popular mosque. About 300 adherents
attend Friday services. Zacarias Maza,current director and one of the imams of the
mosque, is a convert from Cordoba, and he is one of many converts who attends.'^® This
mosque has a history of convert association, including former president Yusuf Idris
Martinez from Leon, but also a deep connection to the immigrant population. Today it
attracts Muslims from Morocco, Syria, Senegal, and Pakistan alongside converts and is
host to two Mauritanian imams. Sheiks Hamid and Abderrabman.'^' This mosque has
existed in the same location since the early 1980s, and was at one time attended by
Abdalqadir and his Morabitun followers. It is al-Taqwa that is credited with the
community building and integration of the immigrant Muslim population into the
economic activities of the Albaicin neighborhood and the conversion of the neighborhood
from crime ridden and poor to safe and a magnet for tourist euros into the Orientalist
32

flavored shops and restaurants.
In addition to these two major convert mosque communities in the city of
Granada and Murabit links in Cordoba and Sevilla, there is a sort of“Mega-Mosque”
complex that has been constructed near the town of Puebla de Don Fadrique, within the

EFE."La mezquita se abrira en la Cartuja en 2010." Diario de Sevilla 13 Mar. 2008.
Barrera. Javier. "El retorno del Lslam a Granada." ABC 28 Feb. 2006.
Ortega Dolz. Patricia. "La mezquita del barrio." El Pais 13 Mar. 2004.
Barrera. Javier. "El retorno del Islam a Granada." ABC 28 Feb. 2006.
Doiibleday..Simon R.. and David Coleman. In the Light of Medieval Spain: Islam the West and the
Relevance of History. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming 2008.
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province of Granada. In this more mral setting, the Spanish convert family Romero has
built a sprawling mosque and madrasa, complete with cafeterias, libraries, and hotel
accommodations. Director Antonio Romero Roman is educated in both secular and
religious studies, as well as influential in community and regional politics. He has held
the position of mayor in Puebla de Don Fadrique since 1996 when he ran as a member of
the Green Party and in 2002 founded his Faculty of Andalucian Studies on the complex
site. They claim no official ties to any Islamic nation or organization, and follow no
specific Islamic school of law. Following the popular Granadino model of a hippie
lifestyle often associated with early Sufi followers of the late 1970s and early 80s, the
community is a functioning self-sustaining organic farm. In their words,‘The centre is a
running farm based on ecological principle. It promotes principles of natural health
,33

systems and therapies.'

It attracts tourists and life-long-learners from England, France,

and Egypt as well as from within Spain, offering tour packages and even airport pickup.
Although it seems to be entirely outside of the mainstream Granada, Cordoba, and Sevilla
communities, this certainly shows the preservation of the convert-New Age movement
and its popularity with the tourism and education sectors.
Both mainstream Granadino groups justify the renewed Muslim presence in
Amdalucia using historical rhetoric that includes notions of convivencia, but it seems as
though the Murabitun have a much more forceful manner ofjustifying their existence.
The name they have chosen to represent themselves is in itself a historical reference.
derived from that of the Al-Mohavides, the second of the North African Islamic tribes
which swept through Spain in the eleventh century after the Al-Mohades’ invasion in the

u.

About Us." Al-Mcuimsa. 4 Feb. 2008 <http://al-madrasa.com>.
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eighth.^** Abdalqadir has promoted a pan-Islamic nation that would encompass the Iberian
Peninsula and refers to the “unbridgeable gulf between the world’s two billion Muslims
..35

and the lost lesions of the kuffar

on his website. The “capitulations of Granada,” a

fifteenth century document on the promised treatment due to Muslims after the expulsion
of the Granada Nazari leader, Boabdil, is posted and critiqued on the official Grand
Mosque website by Castihiera.'^^ The critique accuses the modem government of going
back on this old promise, which it insists has “never been abolished,” saying
“Paradoxially, the established rights of Muslims on that historic date were much more
ample and generous, than those that today a State that calls itself democratic, tolerant.
and defender of human rights and liberties, recognizes. It continues in emphasizing the
proper home of Muslims in Spain,
“Neither is there a reason to make us think that these conversions
happened only in the final time period of al-Andalus’ history... but it is
logical to think that during most of the centuries of Muslim presence on
the peninsula many of what they call “converts” in reality had been in
their ancestry generations past. That is, they were native Muslims... the
same as the Bosnians that are a Slavic Muslim population or tlie Sudanese
that are African Muslims.”
The emphasis throughout the paper on “Our legacy, our identity, and our
historical memory” is made clear. References to the Spanish language’s plethora of
Arabic-origin words are made as the case for further recognition of rights is presented.
Such an insistence is created by an organization that has so far refused to directly take
part in the national “Comision Islamica de Espana,” the national-level organization which

Doubleday, Simon R., and David Coleman. In the Light of Medieval Spain: Islam, the West and the
Relevance of History. New York; Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming 2008. p 223.
As-Siifi, Abdalqadir. The Website ofShaykh Dr. Abdalqadir as-Sufi. 15 Nov. 2007.
<() .7 Dec. 2007 <http://www.shaykhabdalqadir.com/content/index.html>. Kiiffar xeitvs to heretical people.
'Islam en al-Andalus." Mezqnita de Granada.6 Dec. 2007
<http://www.mezquitadegranada.com/islamenalandalus/index.html>. Translations are my own.

16

reprcsenis Muslim interests, instead opting for groups directly sponsored through their
Mosque such as the European Muslim Union and la Comunidad Islamica en Espaha. This
rhetoric is not unfamiliar, as Abdalqadir has long been promoting “The return of Islam to
Spain*' rather bluntly through the Spanish branch of his organization named exactly that
in the 1980s. Although their influence continues through Mansur Escudero and the many
Andalucian mosques with connections to La Sociecladpara el Retorno de Islam al
Espana registered under FEERI, the Murabit rejection of formalized government
organizations keeps the voice of the community from having power in the Spanish forum.
The continuins thread of isolationism and rejection of the modem world
is evident throughout the Mosque’s publications. After insisting that “Muslims were
once synonymous with hospitality and generosity in the West,” it offers a gloomy portrait
yi

of modern materialism that it relates to the West.

The idea that a debt of gratitude is

owed to the Muslims of Spain is followed with an ultimatum “Our position is that this
reconciliation be made through the route of intelligence, wisdom and justice that will
generate a new era of splendor on this earth. If not, on the contrary it will cause a
confrontation that could be avoided.”
Whereas the Murabitun seem to use the justification of their presence as a means
to isolate themselves from the Catholic majority, the other major convert forces in
Andalucia seem to be more interested in recreating the romanticized version of alAndalus. Though the Murabit community claims to seek a universal convivencia, they
insist that it be on their terms, which tend toward a radical leftist political ideology. After
insisting on Spanish and world attention as an Islamic community, they reject the

Puertas ahiertas. compasion y solidaridad." La Mezquiki de Granada. 4 Feb. 2008
<http://www.mezqiiitadegranada.com/sobrelamezquita/piiertasabiertas.html>.
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opportunities to represent their interests on a meaningful national level, an opportunity
other political Islamist movements would embrace as a means to achieve their goals. As
prex iously noted, the al-Taqwa adherents are largely responsible for the rapid
development of the lower Albaicin and actively espouse the virtues of convivencia.
Africans and “The Religion of the Arabs”
The majority of the Muslim population of Spain is immigrant, largely from
nearby ex-colony Morocco. In addition, the metropolitan Granada area is home to a
growing population of Senegalese Muslim immigrants. Ethnicity divides black Africans
Muslims, Arabs, and Berber/Amazigh Muslims from Mauritania, Morocco, and Algeria.
While individuals may have come to Spain for a variety of reasons and with distinctive
ways of practicing their faith, they have come to represent a sector of Muslims that
remain practically underrepresented and isolated within the Andalucian community, more
than thirty years after the first immigrants began to arrive on her shores. This is due
partly to the attitude of Spaniards and partly because the immigrant experience tends to
isolate migrants economically and socially. Nevertheless, attempts are being made today
by the immigrant Muslim community to justify their presence, often by interpreting the
Islamic past of Spain.
Strictly in numerical terms, the migration reversal since the 1970s in Spain has
seen immigrants from three major regions: Europe, Iberoamerica, and North Africa. Of
these three groups. North Africans constitute the smallest, yet most significant group of
immigrants. The significance lies in the social constmets and Spanish attitudes with
regard to their countries of origin. Gema Martin Munoz cites a 1996 survey of Spaniards
conducted by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas, reporting that when asked
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“Wlien speaking of immigrants that are living in Spain, who do you think of
.38

immediately?” 70% responded “Moroccans and Arabs” and 27% responded “Africans.
This in spite of the fact that that year, according to El Anuario Estadfstico de Extranjerfa,
of all the immigrants living in Spain, Africans constituted about 14.3%, competing
closely with the total Iberoamericans (13.49%). Despite geographic proximity to the
peninsula, the North African immigrants are separated from Spain by culture and
religion. Immigrants from Iberoamerica do not suffer from language difficulties or such
strong cultural differences. The more visible group of North Africans is not offered such
an advantage.
Of the group of immigrants from Muslim majority nations, several countries of
origin stand out. Morocco is first, with 234,937 registered foreign nationals living in
Spain in 2001'^^. Algerians also make up a notable part of the foreign population (nearly
140,000 in 2000, with a 40% increase from 1999), and Senegalese immigrants increasing
to 11,000 in 2000. According to Martin Munoz, Andalucia welcomes 16.72% of
Moroccan immigrants, second to Cataluna.
Among immigrants to Spain (and particularly to Andalucia), many do in fact enter
illegally. Obtaining these numbers is very difficult, and estimates of undocumented
Moroccans based on the 2000 regularization efforts of the Spanish government estimate
some 250000 are living in Spain (about 25% of the total Muslim population).
Interestingly, Spanish nationals tend to think of the Muslim population as “mostly”
illegal and associate Moroccan immigrants in particular with delinquency and crime.
However “..to equate foreigners and immigrants (to) delinquency is no more than
Munoz. Gema Martin. Marroqiaes en Espana: Estiuiio sohre su integracidn. Madrid: Fundacidn Rep.sol.
2003.
ibid
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confused public opinions based on completely erroneous considerations and without
40

sense... as if they were a collective and monolithic entity.

Martin Munoz shows that

delinquency did not rise in the autonomous regions most affected by Moroccan
immigration between 2001 and 2002 and in some cases it was actually reduced.
The major pull for immigrants into Spain from North Africa is economic. MartmMuhoz claims that the North African region consistently had the highest rates of
unemployment (after Sub-Saharan Africa) in the world during the 1990s. With more than
65% of the immigrant population under 25, the employment crisis has involved college
educated North Africans as well as the less educated. Although mostly male, in recent
years female migration has increased. In other situations this is often a case of family
reunification, but in the case of Moroccans in Spain, many are in fact single or divorced,
„4I

who “desire to better their lives and arrive in a country able to search for work,

Most

commonly obtained jobs are in seasonal agricultural labor, construction, hotel services,
and domestic service. As the Spanish government does not recognize any degree obtained
from a non-EU institution. For this reason many students and professors from Muslimmajority countries of origin choose the University of Granada to further their
42 43

educations.

Many of those who arrive with higher education choose not to look for
,44

work in their fields at all, “with the acute feelings of frustration it produces.’

Often this

is due to the employment problem that exists in Spain, and available white-collar jobs are
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more easily accessible to Spaniards and those with European educations. This socio
economic divide signaled by the differences in previously acquired education is only one
of the factors that creates this heterogeneous group.
Ethnicity further divides Muslim immigrants into Arab Africans, Berbers
(Amazigh), and black Africans mostly from Senegal. There is also a minority of
Pakistani, Syrian, and Jordanian Muslims. The differences between the black African
demographic and Arab and Berber demographic are quite noticeable; the black African
immigrant group is almost entirely male and typically less educated. This group
dominates the urban merchandise sales sector, although as Dietz points out, this is
45

changing.

The differences between Arab and Amazigh are somewhat more subtle in the

European context. Despite coming from Sunni backgrounds, the two groups interpret
their religion in very different ways. The main differences here derive from a definite
cultural separation in which Islam is practiced under a more patriarchal system, in the
case of the Muslim who identifies as Arab, and a more egalitarian system for the
Amazigh."^^ Interviews conducted by Dietz and El-Shohoumi indicate the Amazigh tend
to separate Islam from their culture and therefore more amenable to European society,
while the Arabs interviewed did not make distinctions between their culture and their
religion.^^^ The authors posit that this tends to help the Berbers, especially women,in the
integration process.

45

Dietz. Gunther. "Frontier Hybridization or Culture-Clash?" Working Papers 35 (2001). 7 Dec. 2007
<http://repositories.cdlib.Org/ccis/paper.s/wrkg35>.
40
The Amazigh culture has historically placed stronger importance on the role of women in .society,
affecting
the religious interpretations of Amazigh women with the arrival of Islam.
47
Dietz, Gunther, and Nadia El-Shohoumi. Muslim Women in Southern Spain: Stepdaughters of AlAndalus. La Jolla. California: Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, 2005.

21

Because, as Dietz points out, the phenomenon of immigration and permanence in
Andalucia is relatively recent, there is very little readily available community structure of
immigrants in which a newly arrived migrant can quickly find his or her place. Most
immigrants are single, be they male (mostly) or female (increasingly), although many are
man ied men who have left their wife and children in their countries of origin. Although
Spanish NGOs are attempting to create networks for integrating these immigrant
communities, most of community building is done out-of-country, from the country of
origin through marriage or job hunting. One Moroccan man I met described to me the
process of finding work in Granada through his uncle, who also helped him find
housing.**^ Immigrant networking within Spain can take place in several venues, with
mosques also assisting in this process.
Mosques serve as a central point of contact for many migrant Muslims in
Andalucia, and adherents are commonly aligned first by ethnicity or nationality rather
than Quaranic interpretation. While Sol Tarres Chamorro has identified three Muslim
institutions in Sevilla which actively incorporate immigrant life, there are three major
Mosques in Granada whose adherents are mostly from Muslim majority countries
amongst a myriad of unregistered “store-front” Mosques which do not have permanent
imams. In total, Martin Munoz reports that there are 33 Islamic religious entities
registered in Andalucia under the Ministry of Justice."^^ The first of these Granadina
mosques is Assalam, a community of around 1500 people and an average of 150
attendees for Friday services. While most of the community is Moroccan, it also is home

“ A. Boazin. Pers(mal interview. 10 May 2007. Names are changed to protect
interviewee.
Munoz. Gema Martin. Marmcjwes en Espaiia: Estudio sohre su integracidn. Madrid: Fundacidn Repsol,
2003. In addition to the 33 registered Islamic entities in Andalucia, there are 45 in Madrid and 140 in
Cataluha.
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to a sizeable Senegalese group. Dr. Abdul-Qadar Abu Husni is the imam; he hails from
50

Palestine.

Mezquita Masalical Jinan is an interesting case. This mosque is situated in a
typically student center of town. Barrio Zaidm, and is not registered with any of the
major federations despite functioning since 1999. While it does not claim any specific
branch of Islamic Jurisprudence, as do several of the other Granadina mosques, its group
of 150 or so Friday attendees follow the teachings of founder Murid Cheikh Ahmadu
«5I

Bamba,“whose work has been dedicated integrally to the precepts of Islam,

This case

of following a charismatic leader whose ideas do not necessarily follow precedent is not
unlike the situation of the convert followers of the Murabit, although clearly this much
smaller group is not as likely to create such a commotion in the larger community.
The Senegalese community of Sevilla is centered about a group called just that:
La comunidad senegalesa. This group is considered a closed group, established on the
basis of ethnicity and Sunni association. The center provides a place of worship as well
a teaching center of Arabic, a language which, according to Tarres, is largely unknown
52

by the community.

Finally, Mezquita Omar is perhaps the best established mosque in Granada,
having existed since 1966, it is also possibly one of the smallest. It had its beginnings
with a group of Palestinian, Jordanians and Syrians, although today the majority of its
120 Friday faithful are Moroccan. President Lahsen el Himer, of Morocco, does not
.53

employ a particular imam. Rather, the duty “is rotated amongst the faithful.
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as

Another mosque of note that is outside of Granada is in Malaga. The current
president of FEERI also serves as imam to La Union Mezquita, Felix Herrero. Herrero is
a convert, but he has no ties to the Murabit movement, which actually seems to have
stirred up dissent in FEERI, which represents so many converts with connections to
(although no specific Murabit mosques) the Murabitun. Herrero actually claims never to
,,54

have heard of “Retomo del Islam a Espaha.

He has been accused of accepting money

for the building of the mosque through the government of Saudi Arabia and associated
organizations. Escudero and Junta Islamica claim that his mosque has SalafiAVahhabi
sympathies. His mosque again came under fire in 2006, after being “accused of seeking
suicide terrorists in Spain ready to die in an anti-imperialist Jihad in Iraq,” and the arrest
55

of 18 adherents.

Mosque leaders of immigrant communities seem to be constantly fighting
ignorance of the religion by the larger society just as the individual immigrants fight
stereotypes of delinquency and religious fundamentalism that have been associated with
their faith, especially since the March 11 attacks. This is clearly a difficult fight, although
it is always handled with taste. Lahsen el Himer, president of Mezquita Omar, when
asked in an interview “if Islamic fundamentalism is terrorism or wars for God?”
responded “In Islam, religion is not only in your heart, but in the daily practice of
,56

religious values and morals that each person carries internally.’

These sorts of questions

are constantly raised, with converts and immigrant Muslims alike having to defend the
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nature of their religion to the population at large.^^ The convivencia argument is
frequently employed by immigrant Imams to encourage understanding and interreligious
dialogue.
There are organizations that are not religious per se which attempt to “shape what
Islam in Spain should

One of these groups, ATIME, devoted to support the lives of

Moroccan workers in Spain, has actively denounced the influence of Syrian and Saudi
Arabian contributions to the major Muslim representative bodies because of their
departure from more Moroccan interpretations of Islam (most Moroccans follow the
Maliki school). Nevertheless, ATIME is not seen as a legitimate source of religious
doctrine by many Migrant Muslims, rather as an intermediary for union relations.
However, Agrita claims that “the doctrinal Maliki influence in Spain is not claimed by
Moroccan leaders other than ATIME, but is acknowledged as the heritage of al-Andalus,
especially by converts.
Muslim Representation
Through the regional and national government Muslims are able to have a voice.
However, without a hierarchy to provide a unilateral voice for all Muslims, opinions and
interpretations can vary and even conflict. The disjunctive nature of the Muslim
representative body caused by many cleavages and a wide variety of outside influences
on represented groups often fails to allow the myriad of Muslim opinions to be heard.

See interviews with Mansur Escudero (http://www.webislam.com/?idt=:3896.
hMp://\v\\u.vvcbislam.com/?idt=7717 and hup://vvww.vvebislam.com/?idt=73()9) and the comments of
Zacarias Maza and Abdul Qadr Husni (of al-Taqwa and Asalaam mosques, respectively)
http://v\ u vv. v\cbislam.com/?idt=4198.
Agrita. Elena. "Representing Islam in Spain: Muslim Identities and the Contestation of Leadership." The
Muslim World 96(Oct. 2006): .S63-584.
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Nevertheless, these groups are integral to navigating identity formation and are
responsible for negotiating the past on the behalf of the Muslims they represent.
Several conditions have led to the fractured representation of Muslims in Spain.
The 1992 Agreement of Cooperation that created the Comision Islamica de Espaha (the
Islamic Commission of Spain) was based on the communications channels privileged to
the Catholic church, which is wholly non applicable to Islam. While one single notice is
required to voice the opinions of the Vatican there is no such hierarchy in Islam, thus
requiring a general agreement amongst adherents. To say this is a difficult task would be
understatement. Though the majority of Spain’s Muslims are traditionally of the Maliki
School of law officially used in Morocco, many of the most powerful Muslims in the area
are Syrian political asylum seekers from the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood or otherwise
highly educated Middle Eastern men whose backgrounds are not representative of the
majority of Muslims in Spain. Their activity in government relations since the 1970s has
made them much more capable than their newly immigrated counterparts, although their
59

beliefs may not actually reflect those of whom they wish to represent.
The issue of recognition of organizations is another structural flaw of the official
Islamic Commission. Religious minorities must be “well established” to merit
recognition. This notorio arraigo can be gained by proving that the group has a
significant number of organized adherents. It was approved for Islam in 1989 for a
different reason. According to Agrita, the “Muslim legacy as one of the spiritual beliefs
that have formed the historic character of Spain” allowed the legal status of Islam in

Agrita, Elena. "Representing Islam in Spain: Muslim Identities and the Contestation of Leadership." The
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Spain. The recognition of Spain's Muslim roots at the outset shapes the interest the
Commission has in negotiating the past.
Contact between the state and Muslims has always occurred through the medium
of organized representatives, rather than interaction with the communities themselves.
This means that the hundreds of unregistered prayer rooms set up in garages and
basements and the thousands of unaffiliated Muslims are not represented within the
60

system.

Agrita claims that it was primarily this lack of grassroots contact which caused

serious conflicts to arise within the representation. Within three years of the granting of
notoroio cirrai^o to the Muslim community, the Islamic Commission, as represented by
FEERI(Spanish Federation of Islamic Religious Entities) was split in two. The new
organization, UCIDE(Union of Islamic Communities in Spain) would be represented by
Riay Tatari, a Syrian immigrant who began one of the first Islamic organizations in Spain
during the late 1960s.
FEERI was represented in the Commission by Mansur Abdussalam, a Spanish
convert who was bom Mansur Escudero from 1998 until 2001.^* His influence remained
heavy within the fomm during the presidency of convert Abdelkarim Carrasco until
2006, when leadership of the representative body was taken over by Felix Herrero, leader
of the Fuengirola Mosque in Malaga. Escudero’s support for fellow Junta Isldmica
convert Carrasco and their attention to convert matters was a point of contention with
Herrero. Upon election, Herrero stated that “before this, all of the administrations have
been Muslims of Spanish origin, while in reality we ai*e Algerians, Egyptians, and
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Moroccans.

FEERl does, however, support a majority of non-Murabitim convert

communities. With Tatari. Herrero is charged with exclusive representation of Islam in
Spain through the government mandated Islamic Commission of Spain. FEERI’s
influence is mainly southern, in Andalucia, Murcia, and Madrid according to Agrita.
The election of Felix Herrero to the post of president in 2006 was divisive within
the FEERl communities. Herrero’s mosque in Malaga has been raided on several
occasions under suspicion of supporting terrorist activities. Junta Islamica, Escudero’s
community, consistently accuses him of receiving Saudi funds for radical Wahabi
activities. He explicitly stated during the election period that he feared for the
radicalization of FEERl under the leadership of Herrero. Although Herrero ran on the
platform of better representation of the immigrant Muslim community, he himself is a
convert of Spanish origin though the Mosque he leads is mostly comprised of Moroccans.
Divided though it may be and perhaps out-of-touch with those it is charged with
representing, the Islamic Commission of Spain is still capable of causing great waves in
the Muslim communities of Spain and Europe. In 2005,for example, it declared a Fatwa
on the behalf of Spanish Muslims on terrorism, declaring “Bin Laden, his A1 Qaida
organization and all those that carry out terrorist acts in the name of the Islamic religion
»i63

are to be considered outside of Islam.

The fatwa, which was declared ahead of the anti-

terrorism summit hosted by Zapatero’s PSOE government at the Alhambra, was largely
well received by a community trying to avoid discrimination and misunderstanding in a

Europa Press. "Miembros de la Federacion Espanola de Entidades Religiosas Islamicas(FEERl) planean
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post March 11 world. The summit, however, was met with animosity by an
uncharacteristically united body of Granadino Muslims.
The feeling amongst the group, composed of imams and mosque presidents and
directors from al-Taqwa, Asalaam, and Mezquita Omar, with the typical Murabitun
absence, was that the summit only encouraged persecution of Muslims and was directed
at Islam in general rather than in the name of peace. Ibrahim Lopez, Zakarias Maza,
Abdul Qader. and other imams and mosque founders in Granada stated that “Whoever
thought of this idea is an idiot... We don’t understand how anyone that knows the history
„64

and the current situation could start something so stupid, so unnecessary...

In a sense.

this support for the religious fatwa and rejection of the government sponsored event
indicates the attempt to establish a religious authority with a superior influence. Such
publicly expressed disgust is a strong rejection, claiming an ability to handle affairs from
within the community. Amongst Muslims in Granada, the rapid and unusual coming
together of the group does not constitute a truly representative body, as it was not an
established and communally respected group of scholars. Similar logic has applied, for
example, when the Murabit Mosque claimed the name "^Mezquita Mayof'for itself. Such
presumptive behavior caused some discontent among area Muslims. Such a title implies
the ability to speak for the community and an established respect of Muslim and nonMuslim institutions. To assume the qualifier “Grand” for a new Mosque subverted that
65

tradition.

Although the majority of Spanish converts has ties to the Murabit movement, the
sect itself is unaffiliated with the Islamic Commission, consistent with its policies of self64
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isolation. Rather, it has created its own separate community networks through La
Comunickid Iskhnicci en Espana (Islamic Community in Spain). This group is also
integrated in the larger European community of Muslims through the “European Muslim
Union" with bases in Granada, Berlin, Sarajevo, and Istanbul. These connections have
allowed La Mezquita Mayor in Granada to host Turkish officials during anniversary
celebrations. Despite the intentional isolation from other convert groups as well as from
the majority immigrant populations of Muslims, the movement has been successful in
achieving regional (Andalucia) and municipal, especially Granada and Cordoba, visibility
and has a strong voice on local scales alongside its pan-European projects.
Under the tremendous Andaluz regional governing bureaucracy, several
departments have been created to handle the social integration of immigrants, with a
special focus on those from Morocco and Muslim majority countries. Aiming to resolve
problems in ten areas, the Andalucian government has had to change its strategy from
helping to “solve the immigration problem” to “understanding the immigration
66

phenomenon” as Martin Munoz notes. The objectives are social service related,
attempting to increase awareness of, and availability to health care, public housing,
education, and work services in the immigrant community.
PSOE president of Andalucia Manuel Chaves has been in office since 1990.
Throughout his extended terms, he has paid special attention to the issues facing
immigrant and Muslim populations under his jurisdiction. With support from president
Zapatero, of the same party, Chaves has been able to incorporate the policies of
Zapatero’s Alianza de Civilizaciones project, which invokes the language of convivencia
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and tolerance. Junta de Andaluci'a is not shy about expressing the historical influence of
al-Andalus on the current Andaluz identity. The official “welcome” message of the
President on the Junta's website refers to “The great knowledge of our people in the art of
living and coexisting, the spirit of solidarity, and the richness of our mature cultural
..67

foundation.

Such statements reinforce the importance of the Islamic past to the identity

of Andalucia.
Conclusion
These group divisions under the umbrella of Muslims in Spain are important as
they give us clues as to their motivations when negotiating the past with the CatholicSecular majority. A Spanish convert with a high level of education reads the past
differently then does an immigrant fruit picker, or Riay Tatari, president of UCIDE.
Where an immigrant finding success in Andalucia may see convivencia, a Murabit
convert may see a debt owed to Spanish Muslims. These contexts guide the negotiation
of the past and cannot be ignored.
The next chapter explores the other side of the negotiation table: Majority
Andalucian identity. The Islamic past is important to regional identity, but its
preservation comes out of different motivations that those we see in the case of Muslims.
The next chapter explores these motivations in conjunction with the active incorporation
of the past into the daily lives of Andalucians.
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Chapter 2
Developing Identities and the Use of the Past
The prior chapter discussed the variety of sects and practices of Muslim
communities in Andalucia and described the connections and cleavages between them.
This chapter explores the other half of the integration equation; namely, the building of a
regional Andalucian identity. I discuss the history and goals of Andalucian nationalism
{Andcilucismo) and enculturation both through public education and family life. This is
the context in which the Muslim communities of today are forming their identities. This
information shows where overlap can occur in the interests of Muslim and non-Muslim
identity formation in Andaluci'a, with particular attention to the use of the past.
Regional Nationalism and Autonomy
Spain is not divided into states or provinces in the manner that many federated
nations are. Rather, it is divided into 17 autonomous communities. Each community is
self-governing, with individual legislative,judicial, and executive governing branches.
The 1978 constitution, developed upon the death of Francisco Franco, guaranteed this
extreme decentralization of government and restoration of self rule and local cultures as a
reaction to decades of oppression and the imposed uni-culture of Franco’s ideal country.
Franco’s legitimacy as leader was based on his promise to unify the country by
restoring order to the continually failing republic. To do so, he attempted to make his
vision of a homogenous Spanish identity a reality. He declared Spanish the official
language and actively suppressed three other indigenous languages (Catalan, Gallego,
and Euskera), enforced Catholic values and declared Catholicism the official religion,
and created a calendar of public ritual he felt was unique to “Spanish” heritage. The
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Generalissimo used the slogan “Spain is different” to attract investment and tourism in
the last decades of his rule. The popularized images of Spain that are still imagined in the
rest of the world - Sangria, Paella, Flamenco music and dancing, bullfighting, elaborate
Holy Week processions - are remnants of that “unified culture” policy. Interestingly,
these customs and traditions are not indigenous to the entirety of Spain. Most of these
68

exoticized images are historically Andalucian.
Initially, only three autonomous communities were to be given special status as
“historic” communities in the post-Franco system. Galicia, Cataluna, and the Basque
Country laid claim to this status primarily by means of a desire for language preservation.
During the drafting of the constitution in 1977, each of these communities was given
special consideration and was put on a fast track for regional self-governance. Each of
these communities has strongly nationalist convictions which are expressed through
public works projects, their education systems, and legitimate political parties (as well as
ten-orist groups) that fight for further autonomy or even complete sovereignty.
A popular movement to give special historical status to Andalucia sprang up,
reviving the nationalist sentiments that had not been active since the Civil War years. In
1980, the Federal government granted permission to Andalucia to be put on the “fast
track” and in 1981 the Andalucian statute of autonomy was approved.^^ The claim for
special status in Andalucia is unique; unlike those of Cataluna, Galicia, and the Basque
Country, whose claims are almost entirely linguistically based, Andalucia claimed a
history and culture apart from the sixteen other proposed communities. Today, the
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regional governing body. La Junta de Andalucia, promotes the indigenous cultures of the
community, especially the Gypsy and Moorish heritage, through tourism ventures, public
works projects, and public festivals as a unifying cultural force.
AndalLiefans have fierce pride in tlie Flamenco-gypsy heritage. The gypsies that
settled in the hills of Granada have made Barrio Sacromonte internationally known, and
adventurous tourists and students routinely seek out the famed hospitality of the cave
dwelling gypsies. Flamenco bars can be foimd in most districts of the major cities, as well
as dotting the more sparsely populated countryside. Yet, beyond the praise given to their
contribution, the gypsies of Andalucia have been routinely subjected to discrimination
and excluded from larger society. Theirs is the most impoverished ethnic group, the most
undereducated, and suffers the highest unemployment rates. They are painted as thieves
and tricksters, and have been since they arrived on the peninsula during the early fifteenth
century. Today, they are blamed for rampant drug abuse in Spain, both as users and
dealers.

The continual marginalization of gypsies has caused the isolated ethnic group

to lose its actual role in identity creation; they are paid lip service for their contributions,
but these days hippies occupy the caves and French and British are taught Flamenco and
participate in dance and music contests while gypsies struggle to get work.
The Moors represent the second major contributor to “Andalucian” heritage.
Today they are represented by the Muslim populations that attempt to claim
responsibility for the history and culture that make Andalucia different. While Gypsies
were violently oppressed as a non-Spanish ethnic group during the Franco era, the
practice of Islam was absolutely forbidden. Although the claim is often made that after
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Franco's death, Muslims returned to the peninsula for the first time since the reconquista.
they had been quietly present as a tiny minority before the turn of the twentieth century.
The late 1970s and early eighties brought Islam to the fore as a major cultural force with
the two-pronged entry of the religion in Spain, through the sudden inunigration from
North Africa and the convert movement that aimed to recover the convivencia of the
middle ages. In addition to the visibility of the Muslim population, public rituals
celebrate historical battles of the reconquista and annually remind residents of the lasting
imprint left on Iberia by the Moors.
Although the active infusion and celebration of gypsy and Moorish cultures in
that of Andalucia has seen a resurgence in the forty years since Franco’s death, the
incorporation of Muslim traditions into the rhetoric of pro-Andalucia activists has a long
history. The Islamic history of al-Andalus is called on consistently to establish a nonSpanish Andalucian identity. The first man to use such rhetoric is revered in nationalist
circles for his dedication to the preservation of the past.
Bias Infante and the Creation of the Andaluz Identity
During the turbulent years of the early twentieth century, as republics failed and
nationalisms flourished, a leader rose from Andalucia to establish the uniqueness of
Andaluz culture. He promoted its rich history as solely the heritage of Andalucians. Bias
Infante centered his argument first on language, then aroimd the Moorish connections of
the region.
Although still hotly debated today. Infante claimed that the distinctive manner of
speaking employed by most Andalucians went beyond merely an accent or dialect of
Castillian Spanish, but that it was a separate language as different from Spanish as
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Catalan or Gallego. He claimed that the Arabic influences on the spoken Latin based
languages of Spain during the medieval Moorish occupation allowed for “sounds that
cannot be expressed with Castillian letters. In the ‘alif-ato’ (Arabic as opposed to the
71

Latin alphabet)... one can find a more exact written representation of these sounds.

He

proposed the reintroduction of some these letters into a specifically Andaluz alphabet.
especially the c sound, which he claimed more exactly represented the sound the “J
produces in Andaluz Spanish, and the aspirated » as opposed to muted “H” of Castilian
Spanish. His insistence that these characteristics of the Spanish of Andalucia was not
merely defective Castillian but remnants of an ancient blend of Arabic and Latin was
somewhat acknowledged with the 1948 publication of the Jarchas, lyrical poems written
in a mostly translatable romance language known today as “Mozarabic” which, while
related to Spanish. Mozarabic evolved separately out of vulgar Latin.^“ Unfortunately, the
publication of these Jarchas to validate Infante's claims came twelve years too late, after
his execution at the hands of Franco supporters.
Called the “Father of the Andaluz Homeland,” many nationalist circles consider
Bias Infante a martyr for the cause of Andalucian autonomy,fighting for the social
democracy he envisioned for the region. His political party, the Partido Socialista
Andaluz (P.S.A.) still exists today and continues to further Andaluz autonomy. The
impact Infante had on the recreation of Andalucian memory has been profound, as he can
be credited with sparking a renewed interest in al-Andalus. Infante’s affection for the lost
culture was so great, and he was so inspired by the stories of convivencia, that Infante
converted to Islam in 1924. To impart knowledge of an Andalucian history and
‘ Ruiz Romero, Manuel. "Bias Infante y la lengua andakiza." Islam x al-Andalus 71 (Feb. 08). 11 Feb.
2008 <http://www.islamyal-andalus.org/>.
Ibid.
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reestablish the lost al-Andalus, Infante “wanted to provide the Andaluz people with pride
and a lost identity, as an instrument oi liberation, and so the first work he undertook was
to rescue the history, to provide Andalucia with an historical interpretation from her own
.73

being, without lies and without foreign interests in it...

Infante’s life was cut short and

the civil war was won by Spanish nationalists, and his plans were supplanted by the strict
Catholic ideology and uniform identity Franco assumed for Spain.
Infante's religious identity is cause for some upset amongst the Andalucian
community. As the Liga Morisca points out, a national hero that belongs to a tiny
religious minority historically opposed to the “Catholic identity” causes a dilemma for
those fighting for Andaluz solidarity based on linguistic, religious, and historical roots.
Although Liga Morisa, Fundacion de Cultura Islamica, and other Spanish-AI-Andalus
cultural revivalist organizations agree that Infante did indeed convert to Islam during a
sojourn in Morocco, based largely on testimony from his own family and personal
writings, there is a tendency towards disbelief of this fact. This telling discomfort with
the continuing legacy of Islam in contemporary Andalucia is the result of 500 years of a
“war against the Moor and a unicultural education,” imposed with special severity during
the formative Franco years according to Liga Morisca. This is an example of the
contestation of history for the sake of foiming a contemporary identity.
Infante’s plans were not put into practice in Andalucia during his lifetime, but his
ideas are used today to encourage a new generation of Andalucians to embrace the past as
their heritage and a matter of pride rather than shame. By examining to shift from proCatholic Francoist identity to regionally developed notions of identity in the latter
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decades of the tu entieih century, we can see how the group identity of Andaluci'a has
become more open, even welcoming, to the development of a multicultural system that
could include the Muslim groups.
Education and Andalucian Enculturation
Through a comprehensive study of history texts used in the nineteenth and the
first half of the twentieth century, Carolyn Boyd points out the systematic discrediting of
Muslim contributions to Spanish society. Even the most progressive books of the young
and struggling republic of the 1920s “reduced the tension...[between the ‘undeniable
brilliance of Hispano-Arabic civilization' and the ‘triumph of freedom-loving Spaniards
over a backward people'1... by nationalizing the invaders, transforming them into ‘moros
espaholes,' who could be comfortably assimilated into a tradition of national
,,74

greatness.

This was on the liberal end of the scale which including a text that covered

the religious virtues of Queen Isabelle and spent 40% of its pages discussing the
reconquista, with only two pages dedicated to Islamic Spain.
In the attempt to indoctrinate Spanish children with the rhetoric of a pure Catholic
Spain, the identity of the people was formed around the identification of the “other.” This
other, the Moor, is so much a part of peninsular history that the distinction cannot be
perfectly clear, especially in the case of Andalucia. Who was responsible for the great
works of art and architecture, science, mathematics, religious translation, and general
peace that flourished for eight centuries? The Spanish cannot claim these achievements
entirely for themselves, for it was under the rule of the Caliphs that Spain reached this
peak, and to relinquish the glory to its Muslim inhabitants would be giving that heritage
up in return for so many bloody wars, the inquisition, and the Crusades. As Boyd noted,
Can^lyn Boyd. Hisforia Patria. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997.
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nationalizing the Muslims is one tactic: many Spanish Muslims today call themselves
Mozarabs, and there are still populations in northern Morocco who claim to be
Andalucians.
The renewed presence of Muslims, both immigrant and convert, in Andalucia is
forcing Andalucians to confront their identity discomfort. Helping to cope are many
cultural awareness and education NGOs. including Fundacion Euroarabe, Fundacion Tres
Culturas, Fundacion de Cultura Islamica, and Casa Arabe, all of which are supported in
some capacity by regional government, and most of which have their headquarters in
Andalucia (Granada, Seville. Madrid, and Cordoba respectively). All except Fundacion
de Cultura Islamica receive government money(“FUNCI” raises funds independently)
for their activities. In addition to these and many other highly active cultural NGOs and
scholastic institutions, la Junta de Andalucia, the regional government of Andalucia,
promotes the cultivation of Andalucian culture through legislation.
Autonomous communities are responsible for the curriculum of their public
education institutions, giving Andalucia the opportunity to rectify some of the omissions
and prejudices of previous educational experiences. As Dietz notes,

Moorish Legacy

of al-Andalus... has been rather successfully used by the regional government... in
educational policy, introducing a distinctively regionalist interpretation of officially
,,75

taught history at school.

Beginning with primary education, today’s public schools

incorporate subtle but definitively nationalist language into the material. In the preamble
to a state sponsored document on teaching methods, Manuel Ruiz writes: “Following the
political recognition of our national character, or of our national identity through the
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Statute of Autonomy, it is time to approach the reality of that which individualizes us
,.76

with respect to the other communities: our culture.

This concept of enculturation at an

early stage is not new’ to Spain, but is certainly new to regional learning since the end of
the Francoist regime. The aforementioned document is used as a guide for teachers and
administrators and w as published with the support of Junta de Andalucia. It is explicit on
the methods to be used to encourage the appreciation of the individual character of
Andalucia. Islamic civilization in Andalucia is mentioned seven times, with one
recommended text dedicated specifically to “Islamic Andalucia.” One interesting note
mentions that the work of Arab mathematicians should be emphasized in math courses,
especially in geometry as it is “possible to use it as a didactic resource for the artistic
production of our cultural heritage.” Catholicism is completely absent from the 78 page
document. Although it does not explicitly list Islamic or Catholic religious education in
the text, it leaves the door open for such education by suggesting that a culturally
enlightened curriculum would include “Themes of religious beliefs, including religious
practices, ritual forms, festivals and traditions, and customs of the major turning points in
life (birth, death, etc.)”.
In addition to this “regionalist interpretation,” the rising interest in Islam and its
place in Andaluz history have produced an experiment in religious education in the name
of encouraging cultural pluralism. Though it has its detractors, the courses offered in
Islamic beliefs and history in public schools have been met largely with praise from
Muslim (particularly immigrant) communities and what Dietz has dubbed the
“Islamophilic” sector of Andalucians. In accordance with a 2004 declaration, more than
20 new teaching positions were opened in five autonomous regions for this purpose, with
Rui/ Carmona. Manuel. Im Cultura Amialuzo en la EditcacUm Primaria. Seville: Cromoarte, 1992.
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Andalucian cities Granada, Sevilla, Alegeciras, and Malaga receiving some of the
positions. Andalucia \\ as the only autonomous community (in addition to Moroccan
enclaves Melilla and Ceuta) to have an existing Islamic education program prior to this
77

development.
The loudest complaints regarding the Islamic education programs have not come
from Catholic authorities or traditionalist Spaniards but from convert Muslim
communities, notably the Murabitun discussed in the previous chapter. For this sect, the
involvement of public education in religious discourse can only serve to secularize the
culture of faith that they are attempting to cultivate. To counter this, a project is
underway to construct a private Islamic school on the outskirts of the city of Granada,
under the auspices of la Mezquita Mayor de Granada. Known as “Fundacion Educativa
A1 Andalus,” the school would provide primary, secondary, and technical education to
7ft

area Muslims as well as provide boarding facilities for those not from Granada. The
Murabitun are using the well-intentioned actions of the Andalucian government to
maintain their isolation from both the Catholic majority as well as the immigrant Muslim
population. Immigrant communities including al-Taqwa mosque approve of the
79

programs, saying that they would encourage understanding and inter-religious dialogue.
Spain on the whole is tolerant of Islamic customs within the purview of
government relations, especially in comparison to other Western European countries. The
44

head scarf issue,” for instance, has only arisen a handful of times. Each time, the head
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scarf was ultimately allowed. The most recent incident involved a Moroccan girl in
Cataluha, in October of 2007. Each time that the issue has been brought to Spanish
authorities it has been deemed discriminatory practice to disallow a child to continue
attending school with the traditional head covering. The current party in government
control (and in Andalucian regional government), the PSOE,continues to assert its
80

opposition to any legislation which would “regulate” the use of the head scarf.
Though public education is obviously a very important part of the enculturation of
any child into his or her society, another important element is family customs, including
stories told to children or festivals in which a family may participate. One native
Granadino professor, well versed in the Islamic history of Andalucia recalled an
interesting myth he had heard in his childhood regarding the fear of an anticipated return
of the Moors. Referencing a decorated gate or “bab” in the outer wall of the Alhambra, in
which a hand and a key are carved, he was told that “when the hand clutched the key, the
„81

Moors would return.

The Alhambra being an extremely well fortified stmcture, the

idea that the wall should fall and the hand and key somehow come into contact would be
about as likely as a supernatural force changing the image. Nevertheless, the tale
underscores that fear that was instilled in his generation, that the Islamic world would
come back someday to reclaim A1 Andalus. For Puerta, this initial fear sparked an interest
that would eventually lead him to his passionate study and depth of understanding of the
Islamic world. Likewise, my host mother expressed interest in my research on the
Muslim community, asking “If I knew much about the Moors,” if I could tell her some. I
obliged her, and she told me that when she was in school,“History began with the
80 .
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Catholic Kings, and as a result she never learned about the influence of Islam on
Andalucia, although she knew by looking through her window at the Alhambra that it
must have been great/ hi her case, like that of Puerta, initially taught fear gave way to
curiosity in the liberated post-Franco age.
Tales of reconquista-era heroes permeated both school and home life for many,
and still do today. Imagery of such heroes abound. In the Catholic Cathedral of Granada,
a place of honor is given to a gruesome statue of Santiago “Matamoros”(Moor-killer),
mounted atop a pile of the slaughtered Muslim enemies. El Cid, the famed defeater of the
Moors and dutiful Catholic, is still taught through poetry and revered in Spanish
literature, despite modem evidence that El Cid was probably a mercenary whose skill set
was sold to Muslims and Catholics alike; the Catholics simply bid higher during the most
important battles.^'^ The story of El Cid is not the only one to have suffered political
manipulation for the sake of the Catholic identity of Spain. Guzman A1 Bueno, another
hero of the reconquista, was likely a Muslim himself, raised in Morocco. It is possible
that he was given land in A1 Andalus by the Caliphs and earned his fame merely by
84

fiercely defending his property.
Are monuments, linguistic remnants, and controversially racist public festivals
dedicated to the expulsion of Muslims and Jews enough to bring the Muslim minority
closer to acceptance, or will they be merely iconic of Andaluz identity, forced into the
margins, as has happened to the gypsies? This is precisely what Muslims have organized
to prevent on both the regional (Andalucia) level and the national level. The degree to

82

Ortega Chinchila, Soledad. Personal interview. 27 Feb. 2007.
Fletcher, Richard. The Questfor El Cid. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
84
When the Moors Ruled in Europe. ChannelFour. 1 Sept. 2005. 5 Aug. 2007
<http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-768956312207897325>.
8<

43

which they can succeed will depend upon internal unification among Muslims, which has
had limited fruition to date. Nevertheless, the interest non-Muslim Andalucians have in
revi\'ing the past for the sake of distancing the Andaluz identity from the rest of Spain
overlaps with the Muslim desire to do the same for the sake of legitimizing their religious
presence.
Conclusion:
As this evidence suggests, the modem reinterpretations of Spain’s Islamic past are
cmcial for the development of multiple identities in Andalucia. This fact is understood
and manipulated for the puiposes of the Andalucismo movement as well as Muslims
seeking to link themselves to the regional culture.
The next chapter will discuss specific instances in which the interests of these two
sides do not overlap, resulting in the necessary negotiation over how the past will be
represented. The situations that I will discuss, the Mows y Cristianos festivals and the
Cordoba mosque/cathedral controversy, have very visible links to the Islamic history and
have come to represent an inalienable part of Andaluz culture. The Islamic Commission
has had its chance to weigh in on the issues, as have leaders of individual Islamic
communities across Spain. Their opinions resonate with the new understandings of
Islam’s history in Spain, and ask who the history belongs to. Can it be purely Spanish or
can it be called simply Muslim,somehow outside of Spanish culture? In either case, does
one group or the other have the authority to change tradition at will?
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Chapter 3
Public Ritual and other Contested Points of Hispano-Muslim Contact
This chapter discusses specific examples of the past as it is used for cultural
reaffirmation in Andaluci'a. These two examples are being contested by the Muslim
population, which wants more participation and inclusion in remembrance of
convivencia. This chapter also addresses two recent events that have called into question
the actual tolerance for Islam practiced in Spain. In addressing the riots in El Ejido in
2000 and the Madrid train bombings in 2004,1 argue that the end result has been an
increase in xenophobia and not necessarily in Islamophobia. Andalucians separate
nationality from religion in order to justify the continued celebration of the Islamic past.
Moros y Cristianos, Real and Imagined
Andaluci'a has long been known for its elaborate annual festivals, attracting
tourists from all over Europe and farther to Seville for solemn Semana Santa(Holy
Week) processions, Cadiz for the gaiety of Fat Tuesday, and regional “ferias” displaying
bull fighting and flamenco dancing for weeks at a time. Many Andalucian and Valencian
cities also celebrate festivals of “Cristianos y Moros”(Christians and Moors), in which
epic reconquista era battles are reenacted and citizens enjoy parades of brightly adorned,
defeated “Moors” and welcome the triumphant “Christians.” Each town which celebrates
such a battle has its own twist. In some places, the festivities are followed with a
symbolic mass baptism of the actors portraying Moors. Major festivals take place in
Alcoy, La Vila Joiosa (both in Valencia) and Granada.
The festivities are a major undertaking for the towns that celebrate them. 4 000
kilograms of gunpowder were used in last year’s Alcoy celebrations, and over 440 000
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euros were spent in 2006 on La Vila Joiosa’s festivities.

In Granada, El Dia de la

Toma celebrates the final conquest of the Catholic Kings on January second of every
year, attracting 6 000 tourists and Granadinos to the festivities. Each of these
celebrations have been practiced with pride for hundreds of years, but recently increased
sensitivity among locals to the Muslim presence in the region has fueled an initiative to
modify or completely remove, in whole or in part, traditions considered insulting or
obscene. Valencian towns only recently stopped selling Mohammed dolls with fire
cracker heads to children and setting fire to a larger-than-life representation, swapping
these activities for “dragging the puppet Mahoma through the streets” and performing a
88 89

theatrical conversion and baptism of a Spaniard dressed as a Moorish leader publicly.
In Granada, proposed changes to Dia de la Toma threaten to completely remove the
antagonistic elements of the parades from the celebration.
Moros y Cristianos is certainly the most obvious expression of medieval
collective memory in Spain, surely so in Andalucia and Valencia. Charting the changes
implemented in the reenactments over the years is a way of gauging the “official” stance
of the party in power. For instance, during the Franco regime, politics were interwoven
into Dia de la Toma to create “strangely political-religious reminiscences that shape the
,90

festivity.

These elements still exist today, mixing with the modem Andalucismo and

regional pride that was forbidden in Francoist Spain. Today, three main groups(neo-
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Francoist nationalists, Muslimophilic Spaniards, and pro-Andaluz nationalists) contest for
the power to mold the fiestas and through them, change the popular interpretation of
history.
Attacks on the festival, particularly in Granada, are not new. Because of the
strong association Dia de la Toma has with Andalucismo(Andalucian regional
nationalism), proponents of the ultra-right denounce the fiesta as anti-Spanish and use the
atmosphere to pronounce their loyalty to the “united” Spain achieved under Franco. Last
year’s Dfa de la Toma brought together around 200 “ultraderechistas” to wave pre
91

constitutional flags and yell anti-government slogans.
Since 1988, a different group has professed its distaste for the event in Granada.
Although the actions taken to tone down the Valencian celebrations have been largely
unprompted by the community, the major symbol of Andalucian pride has been quite
polemic. The opposition, represented under the name Manifiesto 2 de enero declared the
festivities misrepresentative of Nasrid era Granada. With the backing of many University
students and professors, non-Muslims (both Catholics and non-religious), and Muslim
community leaders who have joined the Manifiesto since its first year, the organization
lobbies for Dfa de la Toma to be replaced by a celebration of the convivencia that once
existed in Andalucfa to be called Fiesta de la Tolerancia.^^ Well over 1 000 signatures of
Granadinos have been collected to date in protest of the current festival format. The first
public exhibition of the Manifiesto was in 1995, when the list and proposed changes were
presented to the local governing Ayuntamiento (city council), at the time under a PP
(Partido Popular, the conservative center-right party) Mayor, Gabriel Dfaz Berbel. That
Ruiz, R. "6.000 personas asisten al 515 aniversario del Dia de la Toma. 20mimitos Granada 4 Jan. 2007.
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year, ihe group was largely ignored. The following year drew far more attention with an
art and literature exhibit in the Madrassa Palace with the support of UNESCO and
Federico Mayor Zaragoza, then-director of UNESCO, who “sent a message of
solidarity." That year, UNESCO also sent a letter to Mayor Berbel, insisting that Dia de
la Toma be incorporated into the “Cultura de la Paz” program (Culture of Peace). To say
that the mayor’s response was unfavorable would be an understatement. El Manifiesto 2
de enero’s website quotes Berbel as responding “I shouldn’t change a single comma in
„93

the festivals" and stating that the group that signed the manifest was “absurd,

Current

mayor Jose Torres Hurtado, also of the PP, has been somewhat more conciliatory towards
the movement, or at least not as outwardly hostile toward their ideas as was Berbel.
Successfully politicizing the issue, the PP and PSOE seem to have cemented their
attitudes towards the event. While the PP insists on the status quo, the PSOE of Granada
(with Francisco Alvarez de la Chica representing the party) offers a compromise that has
earned the backing of the Izqidf^rda Unida (United Left), Manifiesto 2 de enero (January
2 Display) and Plataforma Granada por la Tolerancia(Granada Platform for Tolerance).
The PSOE and its backers have openly stated that “The PP is responsible for the current
situation". This plan is essentially a compromise between the nationalist tendencies of the
event and the progressive convivencia leanings of the academic and Muslimphilic
populations, calling for the regular processions in the morning followed by a celebration
of Muslim, Christian, and Jewish traditions in the afternoon. Put forth in December of
last year by Lola Ruiz Domenech, representative of the Izqiiierda Unida in Andalucia,
the idea is “to transfoim the ritual... into a program of acts that cement the respect,
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equality, and tolerance between the peoples, their beliefs, and the individuals,

In line

with the UN’s Alliance of Civilizations project spearheaded by PSOE president Jose Luis
Rodriguez Zapatero (and therefore commonly known by its Spanish

Alianzci de

Civilizcicio/ies), the lU and Manifiesto 2 de enero are working to have this plan approved
by 2013, the 1000^*^ anniversary of Granada’s independent self-rule.
Although it is a hard fought battle in Granada, Valencian festivals have removed
potentially offensive elements without outside provocation. The changes have been
administered through the private organization National Union of Festive Associations of
Moors and Christians(UNDEF). In the wake of the Danish cartoon fiasco, UNDEF
president Francisco Lopez Perez insists that removing these elements is not necessarily
done to avoid offending the Muslim populations of the towns but to “avoid providing a
pretext for extremists,’’ echoing the reasoning behind Zapatero’s Alianza de
Civilizaciones, which came a few months after the devastating Madrid train bombings. In
an interview with NPR’s Jerome Socolovsky, the representative of the Islamic
Community of Valencia stated that “Muslims understand perfectly that the Muhammad
figure is a local tradition that does not refer to my faith.” Interviewing a Muslim
immigrant, Socolovsky shows that the general feeling amongst Muslims in the region is
that, while offensive, the baptisms and burning of effigies “are traditions not intended to
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offend anyone” in contrast to the uproar caused by the Danish cartoons.
This understanding that the Islamic community seems to have gained of
Valencian and Andalucian rituals is notable in the fact that it is not the Muslim immigrant
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community that initiated these reforms but rather Spanish nationals more concerned with
inciting violence than showing disrespect to a minority culture. This seems particularly
clear in the Valencian case, with subtle differences in the Granadino case. The exception
comes from Felix Herrero, Malaga’s “Union Mosque” Imam,convert and current FEERI
president. Herrero claimed offense to the celebrations, and asked that they be removed.
He declared as representative of FEERI to European Press that “they have no place in a
democratic Spain,” again calling on Spain’s fascist past as a reminder of Spain’s
supposedly tolerant contemporary character (for more information on Herrero and his
96

mosque, see chapter 1).

As the xenophobic and racist elements are removed from the

celebrations, UNDEF began the process of applying to have the festivals declared
“Patrimony of Humanity” by UNESCO in 2006.
97

While Valencia’s celebrations, which occur in at least 75 towns along the coast,
are largely regarded as simply small town custom, there is an element of shame that is
attached to Dia de la Toma. This is due first to the event that is being commemorated. No
costly siege was ever laid to the walled city; there was no fierce battle on that January
day (despite being depicted as an epic battle in a massive mural at El Escorial monastery
near Madrid). The city was simply handed over after a signing of the Capitulations of
Granada by Queen Isabel and Nasrid King Boabdil, as he is called by Spaniards. As the
legend “The Sigh of the Moor” goes, Boabdil’s shame at loosing the city was expressed
as he looked back on the city from a mountain pass in the Alpujanas, as he was chastised
by his mother for giving up Granada. The next hundred years essentially constitute the
genocidal removal of the Moors and Jews from Spain. Although celebrated for the
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following 500 years as a “return” of Catholicism to Spain, the revisionist trends of the
1900s challenge that view, as does the modem notion of Andalucian identity.
Convivencia being incompatible with the expulsion and intolerance of the postreconquista era, progressive minded citizens would certainly prefer to associate
themselves with the former rather than the latter. Thus, in Granada,though outwardly
extending the olive branch to the Muslim and Arab community of Granada,the
Manifiesto 2 de enero movement exposes this difficulty in reconciling the celebration of
identity with the new understanding of the past.
The multifaceted Andalucian identity is countered by the pro-Francoists of the
ultra-right. They insist that Dia de la Toma (although they are strangely silent on the
Valencian festivals) retain its military-political-religious elements, which were enhanced
during the Franco years to emphasize 1492 as a year that would epitomize the Spanish
identity. In the liberalized Spain of today, these elements only serve to multiply the
shame Manifiesto members feel toward the event. Thus, although the event is claimed as
something purely Andalucian and therefore a part of regionalist culture, its association
with the “unified” Spanish culture imagined in Franco’s time(and still today much of the
tourist population), it is undesirable in the attempt to establish grounds for further
autonomy. This is useful for the proponents of Dia de la Tolerancia in their attempts to
distance Andalucia from Spain’s fascist past while continuing to establish a unique
identity through the festival’s celebration of Muslim-ruled convivencia.
One way or another these festivals seem destined to change significantly over the
coming years. The increasing visibility of the Muslim community is acting as a catalyst
for that change. Andalucians and Valencians cherish their heritage but fear radical
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Islamist retribution, and Muslims seem willing to help constmct a moderate alternative
that celebrates both sides of history. The desired levels of change vary amongst leading
Muslims from complete removal of the festivals to a “live and let live” policy tolerant the
host culture’s inherited customs, making clear yet more ideological differences in
politically oriented Muslims. The lack of a unified voice on the issue may delay the
process of change or simply put it entirely in the hands of the Catholic and Muslimophilic
population.
Contesting Sacred Space and Popular History
Another very visible symbol of Andalucia’s Muslim past stands in Cordoba, a
tribute to the architectural genius of the Spanish caliphate: The Grand Mosque of
Cordoba. No stranger to changing religious tides, the land itself provided the foundation
for a pagan temple during Roman rule, a Christian chapel in the Visigoth period, a
Mosque during the caliphate, and today is a recognized Catholic Cathedral. Today, the
contests continue as Andalucian Muslims ask for the right to pray inside the MosqueCathedral alongside Catholics.
Spearheading the quest for the right to pray at the mosque is Junta Isldmica, an
organization registered under FEERI(one of two groups represented at the Islamic
Commission of Spain), and led by Spanish convert Manuel Escudero. Escudero began
circulating petitions and writing to both government officials and Catholic clergy more
than 20 years ago. He formally submitting a request to the Catholic Church in 2004 at the
Pontificate Council for Inter-religious Dialogue’s Muslim-Christian meeting. After being
rejected, the project came to a turning point in Febmary 2006, when Junta Islamica
approached president Zapatero and Turkish president Recep Erdogan as partners in the
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Alianza de Civilizaciones project. The request asked that in the spirit of the Alianza,
Erdogan consider the possibility of re-opening the once Christian Basilica Hagia Sofia in
98

Istanbul to Christians and Muslims.

In December 2006, the contest for use of the building was in full swing, receiving
press from the major Spanish outlets as well as several European and international
newswires. Escudero was seen praying outside the doors of the Mosque after multiple
letters to the Archbishop of Cordoba had been rejected. Currently functioning solely as a
Cathedral, the Archbishop conceded the possibility of shared use of the space, but
nevertheless Escudero asked the Pope himself to intervene. The vicar of the Cordoba
archdiocese expressed his sympathies to the situation. Ultimately he argued that the
situation of Christians in Islamic states was similarly poor. The decision was ultimately
turned over to the Catholic Church after the municipal, regional, and state governments
all declared it to be a religious affair outside the jurisdiction of secular government. The
government’s relationship with the Catholic Church is further exemplified by Cordoba s
PSOE president Jose Antonio Ruiz Almenara justifying the government’s decision to
remain outside of the debate with a quote from the New Testament: “Give to Cesar what
,»99

is due unto Cesar and to God what is due unto God.

In January of 2007, the polemic took an unexpected turn as Escudero and his
group accepted the decisions of the Church for the time being, so as to “better enter an
inter-religious dialogue” with the Catholics. In a move tapping his isolationist roots in the
Murabitun sect, Escudero asked the members of Junta Islamica not to participate in the
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inter-religious prayer protest scheduled through the Avalon Foundation to take place
February 1, 2007 in front of the Mosque-Cathedral originally organized to show support
and solidarity/c?r and with Junta Islamica. The event was cancelled, favoring low-key
inter-religious prayers to be held at various dates in Cordoba (at the Murabit mosque)in
100

March and Barcelona in April.
The language of the proposals sent to the Vatican and to government officials
intentionally call upon that of UNESCO documents hailing the Mosque of Cordoba as
“patrimony of humanity.” This particular label is given to sites around the world that
exhibit historical relevance, natural or architectural wonder and/or general cultural
significance and implies that its appreciation ought to be universal. Indeed, the building is
open to tourists and the famed red and white columns and archways have called hundreds
of thousands of visitors a year(over 650 000 in the first two-thirds of 2006), making the
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Mosque-Cathedral one of the most visited landmarks in Spain.

The permission given to

Catholics to worship within the building coupled with the exclusion of Muslims is seen
by Escudero and his compatriots as a violation of this principle.
Though the Cordoba Mosque-Cathedral debate is yet unresolved, the process has
been entirely peaceful, mediated through Muslim representative bodies, regional and
federal government, and the Catholic hierarchy. Taking this as an opportunity for
interreligious dialogue, the Avalon Foundation is helping to find common ground for the
two sides. Junta Islamica is using the example of the once-Cathedral Hagia Sofia in
Istanbul to find compromise. Unfortunately, not all encounters between Muslims and
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Spaniards have been so peaceful in the last decade. Some events have contributed to a
rise in Islamophobia. but also a rise in interreligious dialogue and the search for mutual
understanding.
Islamophobia or Xenophobia?
Although most Muslims in Spain feel tolerated and happy in their host country,
the attitudes of fear and suspicion do persist. The Muslim community in Spain has taken
a more active role in defense of Islam to negate post 9-11 fears, acts of terrorism seem
stir curiosity rather than fear in most Spaniards. Reports of anti-Muslim racism were low.
even after the Atocha train bombings in 2004. In fact, as a response to the train
bombings, newly elected President Zapatero began a UN-joint project called "'Alianza de
Civilizciciones"(Alliance of Civilizations). The name itself intentionally challenges the
Clash of Civilizations” hypothesis of Samuel Huntington. In an attempt to strengthen
ties with Middle Eastern countries, Zapatero also removed Spanish troops from Iraq
within days of taking office. The most shocking example of anti-Islamic behavior in
Spain took on ethnic and class dimensions, rather than assumming religious rhetoric. It
also occurred before 9-11.
The town of El Ejido is situated on the Andalucian coast. It is the region’s
foremost fruit producer, and it has become a magnet for Moroccan immigrants seeking
seasonal work. There are nearly 10 000 Moroccan immigrants there, most of whom have
102

been legalized after a series of immigration asylums.

From Febmary 7 to 10, 2000,

tensions between Spaniards and Moroccans erupted in violent riots and attacks. More
than 100 Moroccans sought medical attention in the aftermath, and many Moroccan-
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owned shops and homes were burned by the mob. This violent reaction came after a rash
of stabbings perpetrated by mentally unstable Moroccans in the space of several
weeks.103
The police force reported that they were ordered not to take action against the
rioters. It was not until 600 policemen were sent from Madrid that order was restored to
104

the town.

The failure of the local authorities to act is a major indicator of an active,

institutionalized xenophobia. Mayor of El Ejido, Juan Enciso, insists that the Moroccan
immigrants are unwanted, despite providing the main source of labor for the prospering
105

agricultural industry.

Accusations of rape and other violent crimes in connection to the

Moroccans appear to provide the fuel for hatred, rather than the economic variable. This
in mind, it is important to see that this group is separated from the Spanish population on
the basis of nationality and socio-economic status. As workers, the Moroccans in the
region do not unite under religion. For practical reasons, they focus on their economic
needs as do the various NGOs that support them. Although the Spanish understand them
to be Muslim, it is not the primary marker used for identification. For this reason, what
we saw in the El Ejido riots is more accurately described as xenophobia, not
Islamophobia. This attitude continues to exist in the area, as evidenced by the fact that
Juan Enciso remains mayor of El Ejido despite continuing to promote his anti-Moroccan
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platform.

The Atocha Attacks and Islamophobia
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Another event that has influenced Hispano-Muslim relations greatly was the
religiously motivated attacks on the train system in Madrid in 2004. Referred to as 11-M
by Spaniards, for “11 March,” the date of the attacks, claimed 191 lives after a series of
ten bombs were detonated during morning msh hour. Seventy people were eventually
arrested in connection to the event. Although the perpetrators have been connected to alQaeda, and despite approval of the bombings by Osama bin Laden,the terrorist network
never officially claimed responsibility for the attack. It is almost certain that the group
107

was inspired by bin Laden’s treat to Spain issued in October of 2004.

The timing of the bombings changed the course of Spanish politics. The ruling
party at the time, the center-right PP,immediately blamed Basque separatist group ETA
for the bombings, misdirecting the investigation following the attacks. Some PP party
members continue to insist that ETA was involved.108 President Aznar was replaced by
Jose Rodriguez Zapatero of the PSOE in elections later that month. The reaction from
both the Muslim communities and the newly elected PSOE government was immediate.
As promised, one of his first actions in office was to remove Spanish troops from Iraq, a
109

move that was well-received by the Spanish public.

Meanwhile, Zapatero established

the Alicmza de Civilizaciones to encourage dialogue between Muslim majority nations
and Spain. The Islamic Commission issued a fatwa on terrorism. The PSOE continued to
reject any regulation of the head scarf and continues to support the Islamic Commission
in its attempts to represent the Muslim community. Perhaps as a result of strong
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government leadership in this area, there was not a significant rise in anti-Islamic
sentiment in Spain following the attacks.
Based on surveys, although seven in ten Spaniards fear the “Clash of
Civilizations,” they apparently do not consistently take this out on their Muslims
neighbors with frequency. The Spanish majority does, however,seem to be very
conscious of anti-Islamic attitudes, as evidenced by the fact that 60% thought that “many
or most Europeans are hostile toward Muslims” while only 31% of Muslims in Spain
shared that opinion. This data, collected only two years after the attacks, expresses that
although the Spanish may consciously identify themselves as “hostile toward Muslims,’
their beliefs are not frequently manifested in their behaviors. One in four Muslims in
Spain reported having had “a bad personal experience.” Concern about Islamic
no
extremism in Spain was actually down to 35% in 2006 from 43% in 2005.
Conclusion
Reclaiming both the festivals of Moros y Cristianos and the Mosque of Cordoba
as relics of Islamic history in Spain represents an idea central to the purposes of Islamic
organizations in modem Spain. They seek to reincorporate Muslims into contemporary
discussions of Andalucian identity in a positive light and establish a respect for Islamic
culture as integral to Andalucian culture. The issues of the festivals and the mosque are
merely platforms for the demand that Muslims be recognized as a part of Andalucia’s
rich history (and its inheritors). The convert population uses the Mosque most
successfully to draw attention to its cause to be recognized as an indigenous population
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through its historical ties to the region, while the immigrant population is the more active
focus of the festivals, particularly in Valencia.
Meanwhile, events like the riots in El Ejido and the train bombings in Madrid
seem to contradict or even negate the peaceful progress made through these negotiations
and interreligious dialogue. It is the Andalucian interpretation of these events that
prevents any such back stepping. By recognizing the events in El Ejido as “anti
immigrant” rather than *‘anti-Muslim,” Andalucians separate themselves from the alleged
troublemakers. In this way, they are able to maintain pride in their sense of self as
“inheritors of the Hispano-Muslim Empire,” without excluding Muslims on a religious
basis. The train bombings prove a more difficult problem, as they were expressly
religiously motivated. However, an increase in interreligious dialogue and the active
denouncing of Islamic terror on the behalf of the Islamic Commission has encouraged the
rapid decrease in Islamophobic feelings.
The festivals and historic monuments in Spain are vital not only to identity
politics, but also the economic welfare of the region. The involvement of the Muslim
community in drawing attention to these tourism hotspots has done more good than harm,
and as we will see in the next chapter, the building of Islamic communities in Andalucia
acts as a separate draw for economic stimulus, giving the Spanish public economic
incentive to integrate the Muslim communities. While this chapter showed situations in
which the interests of Muslims and non-Muslims were in conflict, the next chapter
elaborates on a situation where these interests overlap.
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Chapter 4
Collective Memory Manipulation,Economy,and Islam
As the primary driving force of the Andalucian economy,the region received 20.6
million visitors in 2001. Though many are domestic tourists, 34% (7.1 million) of
Andalucian tourism is from outside of Spain. Spain is the second most popular tourist
destination in the world, next to France. Its popularity is growing, too, as it received a
3.4% growth in tourists from 2000 to 2001. The Alhambra’s nomination for one of the
“new seven wonders of the world” in 2007 also boosted tourism to the region. Andalucia
is the most popular autonomous community in Spain, receiving 14% of the total tourist
population. Its pristine beaches are a popular spot for the annual pilgrimages made by
Spaniards for summer holidays, but directly after “Climate” and “Beach” as reasons for
Mill

visiting, tourists cite “Culture” and “Monuments.

Home to the second most UNESCO World Heritage sites in Europe(40 to Italy’s
41)Spain is an avid promoter of tourism with 35 million euros in Andalucia’s tourism
board’s budget. In 2001, income from tourism in Andalucia was over 13 billion Euros. In
2006, over 2 million Andalucians were employed in the service sector(238 000 in
112

accommodation services).

The draw to Andalucia is obvious; aside from the beaches.

cultural minded tourists frequent Granada, Seville, Cordoba, and Ronda for their
historical legacies as represented in monuments, art and architecture, and celebrated
museums. Where would Andalucian tourism be were it not for the draw of its many
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Islamic heritage sites? And so, for the sake of the economy, the tourism board has
vigorously promoted its Muslim past through various campaigns.
This leaves the Islamic communities of Andalucia in an interesting position to
promote their ideas and gain an important role in the economy, becoming a fixture as
vital to foreign interest in Andalucia as the buildings left centuries ago. The opportunity
has not gone unnoted, as indicated by crowded shops catering to tourists selling “Arabstyle" carpets and lamps. Capitalizing on this venture along with the regional government
has both positive and negative consequences for Muslims as well as non-Muslims in the
shaping of Andalucian identity and integration of religious minorities.
Tourism Promotion in Andalucia
After three years of work, the Legado Andalusi

“Legacy of Andalcfa”)

project officially began in 1995 under the joint supervision of King Don Juan Carlos I,
President Manuel Chaves of Junta de Andalucia, the offices of the Sport and Tourism
Council and the Culture Council, sponsored through Junta de Andalucia, the tourism
board, and the European Regional Development Fund. The Legado project functions to
promote learning about the Islamic past and to strengthen historic and cultural ties in the
1 13

Mediterranean.

One of the ways that it seeks to achieve this is through the diffusion of

information via a series of tourist routes to promote understanding of Andalucia’s Islamic
history through tours and visitations that would, ideally, draw in sufficient funds to help
preserve these monuments.
The language used to describe the project is decidedly progressive. Rather than
refeiTing to “Moorish,” “Muslim,” or even “Islamic” history, the project refers
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exclusively to Spain's “Hispano-Muslim” past. The word “Moor” is entirely absent,
indicating the sensitivity used in the project’s construction as “Moor” has become a
derogatory slur. It discusses the “deep cultural and physical mixing of Africa and Europe,
which left us w ith splendors of which we are the inheritors,” explicitly saying that what is
“most important is the capacity for coexistence and tolerance, in spite of conflict, that
was shared between peoples.” It was created, states the website,“with the profound
conviction that the recuperation of the values of convivencia and tolerance can and
should contribute to creating a more just, humane, and singular society, such that it can
m114

be an instrument for the dialogue between cultures.

This is a tremendous departure

from the childhood stories of fearsome Muslim warriors that would one day return to take
back Andalucia for Islam, now exchanged for softly backlit photography of a turbaned
and bearded man at peaceful study.
This use of “Hispano-Muslim” is especially interesting for the process of identity
building. As mentioned in the prior chapter, this is one way of reconciling the shame of
the reconquista with the development of “foreign” culture on Iberian soil. This term
admits that the flourishing society it addresses was just as Hispanic as today’s Spaniards,
but they were Muslim rather than Catholic. By accepting their contributions to modem
Hispania as Spanish, their expulsion becomes just as much of a loss as a victory. As
Legado Andalusi continuously points out convivencia over conflict, tolerance over
reconquista, it reinforces the feeling of loss and a feeling of Spanish, and especially
Andalucian, solidarity.
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Three of the proposed seven tourist routes have been completed, with one
cLin ently in progress. Each of these paths begins in one of the historic cities of Andalucia
and each ends, intentionally and symbolically, in the final bastion of the Islamic
civilization in Spain, Granada. Each celebrates a route taken by a historical or literary
figure with an interest in the Islamic past, including Washington Irving, author of “Tales
of the Alhambra” and Ibn al-Jatib, a Spanish-Arab historian from the 14^ century. The
rest are named after dynasties or tribes that mled in Spain, including the “Almoravides
and Almohades route,” “The route of the caliphate”, and “The route of the Nazrids”.
Each route is marked with informational kiosks. Kiosks are unmanned and the routes are
through public highways, roads, and or hiking paths, making this effort “free” to the
public but encouraging tourists (and their euros) to flow through rural areas of Andalucia.
Although the establishment of these tourist routes is the most visible
accomplishment of the Legacio Andaliisi project, it actually constitutes one part of a
multi-faceted effort to encourage multiculturalism between Andalucia and the North
African countries through which so much culture and development arrived in the region.
Organizing meetings of Spanish and Moroccan youth, holding talks and participating in
University lectures on the topic of medieval Islamic Spain and the Hispano-Muslim
culture are common activities of the foundation. In addition, many books and
115

monographs have been published within the foundation or with foundation funds.
Eroding a new identity?
To what end is so much effort being put into establishing this idea of a hybrid
Andalucian culture imbued with the Orient within the Legado Andahisi project as well as
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through organizations like Fundacion Euroarabe and the governing tourism board? The
inclusion of Spanish-Moroccan dialogue indicates more than a superficial tourism
enterprise, offering something to benefit Andalucians as well as tourists. But to what
degree is this identity being imbedded as sense of self within citizens themselves? To
what degree has it become commercialized for the sake of the precarious Andalucian
economy? Because of the developments of the last twenty five years or so towards this
alternative reading of history and the addition of Muslims to open Spanish society as
highly visible groups in government and simply on the street, the development of this
identity is in a prime position to be manipulated for economic purposes. In light of the
high concentration of Muslim immigrants in certain neighborhoods, the finest example of
this is found in the Albaicin in Granada, where tourism economics meet a form of
cultural exploitation among the “Orientalist” tea shops and hookah bars.
The case of the Albaicin is interesting for several reasons. One, the neighborhood
is a UNESCO World Heritage site, and therefore protected from extensive physical
alteration.

1 16

While this preservation does in fact freeze artefacts in time, the fluidity of

the population in the neighborhood allows continual development of culture and, in the
case of this historically rich area of Granada, reinterpretations of the past in the
contemporary context (heritage). The Albaicin is becoming a bright and youthful
neighborhood, home to two mosques, several small churches, an old convent, bars and
dance clubs, Moroccan style tea houses and restaurants, and tourist shops. Music is
practically constant, either from gypsy guitars, hippie harmonicas, or an Arab flautist.
While this interesting cast of characters is relatively permanent(including immigrant
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families), the tourist population is certainly what keeps the neighborhood economically
viable. Walk into any of the tea shops on any given evening and while you may be
greeted by a Moroccan “atmosphere,” you will probably not see any Moroccans aside
from the shop's owner. Catering to tourists is the best way to survive in the
neighborhood.
Beebe Bahrami talks extensively about the “tea house” culture of the Albaicin.
She observes that many of the teahouses are actually run by converts, and notes several
who moved to Granada specifically to join the convert movement or Muslims who
117

immigrated to find a “home away from home,

The end result is not as “authentic” as

many tourists would like to believe, but rather an amalgamation of foreign Muslim and
non-Muslim cultures all imitating North African style teahouses. Even those Moroccans
running tea or trinket shops readily told me that they were trying to attract tourists to the
supposed exotic-ness of their atmosphere. After talking to several immigrants from
Morocco and Algeria, I found that none of them had prior experience in their country of
origin running such businesses. One halal meat shop attendant was a mechanic in his
home in Morocco, while others had been engineering or sociology students.
Additionally, some amount of public display of culture is seen, as chatter in
Arabic is heard between men on the streets and the call to prayer is heard from the alTaqwa mosque at the base of the Albaicin from time to time. Within the space of a tourist
neighborhood, the interactions serve a dual purpose as both developing immigrant
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networks and adding fodder to the tourist experience.

As Dietz quotes a Muslim from

Pakistan,
“It still is funny anyways,the same people who don’t like
Muslims, who reject you in other places, when they show
up in (the Albaicin) say ‘How exotic, look at their
headscarf, here they really fit into the picture!’ It’s a little
like living inside a store front-window and being observed
from the outside.”'*^
But w'hile creating a tourist space in the neighborhood, the tourists are unwittingly
observing a culture as it develops, becoming as much a part of it as those who are
constantly participating in it.
While certain critics may call this the rapid consumption of culture and note that
such activity can trivialize and eventually destroy the heritage that breeds the culture and
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therefore invites the tourism, this is not a significantly longstanding culture,

In fact.

the resurgence of the Islamic past that is the basis for building a culture around the
collective memory can be no more than twenty five years old, and was in fact encouraged
to great effect by the Murabitun convert movement in Cordoba and Granada well before
immigrants from North Africa were integrated into the economy outside of seasonal
agriculture. The support derived from tourism becomes as much a part of the culture as
its imagined roots in Africa.
Noting the physical appearances of the Albaicin, Graham notes that the inward
facing, non-central construction of the hillside neighborhood allows the area to not take
on the tourist feel of the “monumental Western city” which focuses the toiurist on a
central (physically as well as in historic or cultural meaning) monument of some sort.
I 18
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Although the Alhambra may perhaps represent this point in Granada,the modem city has
not been built up around the fortress. The Albaicin itself is in fact, on the hill facing the
Alhambra, filtering down from the St. Nicholas Church and overlook and the Grand
Mosque of Granada (all of which are, incidentally, prime tourist destinations). Despite
the lack of centricity in the neighborhood itself, Graham fails to mention this spot, which
serves as the culmination of any Granada tour. Though tour buses do venture up to drop
off tourists, many reach the spot walking and then let their feet carry them down,
inevitably, to the many colorful Albaicin shops.
The developing hybrid culture that continually invokes the imagined past of
convivencia-era Granada in the Albaicin is claiming a space for itself not just physically,
but in the city's economy as well. Working in tandem, neither this culture nor the area’s
tourism would continue to exist without the other. Before the arrival of the halal shops,
falafel stands, and immigrant and convert Muslims that dominate the work force, the
Albaicin was considered a bad part of town, where you went to get drugs or get into a
fight. Initially it was the combined efforts of the municipal government and the growing
convert community that cleaned up the area, now perpetuated by its status (as of 1986) as
a UNESCO World Heritage site and tourist euros. These factors provide a space for the
re-imagination of the past to occur under the condition that it is done in front of curious
tourist eyes. With the continuous flow of foreign and domestic Muslim immigrants,
rather than a stagnant population, tourism is accepted as a part of the Albaicin residents’
world and incoiporated into the daily behaviors of the population. The result is a culture
that is not North African, not Spanish, and certainly not fully representative of “old
Granada," but something visible and something very different that expresses the
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Andalucian notion, as it exists today, of al-Andaliis. As one immigrant from Morocco
who ran the teahouse “El Oriental,” told me when I asked if he considered his services to
121

be Moroccan or Spanish,“No, it is something different. Just something different.
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Yassine S. Personal Interview, May 1 2007. Names changed at the request of the interviewee.

68

Conclusions
The likelihood of the integration of tlie Muslim minority in Spain into the
majority culture is quite high, from my observations, and it is owed in a large part to the
acceptance and grow ing curiosity in the Islamic past of the country and of Andalucia in
particular. I believe that the conditions under which the minority has become visible have
made this process much easier than in other western European countries. First, the
Muslim immigrants to Spain began arriving in a post-Franco era, such an environment
that was determined to eradicate the memories of the harsh time by turning the system on
its head, leaning toward more socialist policies and a highly secularized culture (if not
secularized institutions). The influence of the Catholic Church continued, but the laws of
notorio cirnii^o allowed for religious plurality. The national attitude of “Prohibido
ProhibiT'(it is prohibited to prohibit) brought forth a great opening of Spain to the
world's cultures.
The acceptance of the first Muslim immigrants was economically beneficial for
all parties. Seasonal workers in agriculture and constmction workers were needed to
bolster what would be known as the “Spanish Miracle.” North African immigrants
suffering from high unemployment rates were able to fill that niche. In addition to
economic growth and democratization, the influx of immigrants brought questions
regarding the development of new identities in Spain. The development of new identities
in Spain has coincided with the influx of immigrants, making autonomous communities,
especially Andalucia (as a community of special “historical” heritage status), open to the
incorporation of other cultures that could reinforce the idea of a separate identity.
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In the case of Muslims, their perceived connection to al-Andalus and the Islamic
past of Spain has even earned Islam a place in Andalucfan schools. Andalucian children
are taught to \ alue their Islamic heritage apail from the Catholic dominance of the rest of
Spain, and the Franco-generation is uncovering a national curiosity in the buried past
refused them in Franquista-controlled schools. This overlap, where non-Muslims are
reviving a curiosity and Muslims wish to foster understanding of their religion, creates a
space where tolerance and integration ai*e encouraged.
On the ground level, adaptation to the Muslim presence is also visible. On a more
abstract level, the modification of traditional Moros y Cristianos festivals showcase a
new sensitivity to Muslims, and increasing ease in mosque constmction (especially after
the opening of La Mezquita Mayor in Granada), This also exhibits the willingness to
allow the coexistence of Islam and Catholicism. Although common ground can be more
difficult to find in negotiating the past as it is portrayed in the festivals and at national
monuments, it is being done in a peaceful manner that exposes the arguments of both
sides to the public eye. This inadvertently engages the public in a negotiation of the past
for themselves.
As I mentioned in chapter 3, the Spanish public is conscious of existing
Islamophobia, with 60% believing that “all or most Europeans are hostile toward
Muslims." I believe this awareness has contributed to an active attempt to reconcile
existing prejudice with “Prohibido Prohibir". In fact, only 3l% of Muslims in Spain
found Europeans to be hostile to Muslims at all, significantly lower than the 51,42, and
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397c of Muslims in Gemmany, Great Britain and France, respectively.

74% of
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Muslims felt fairly happy or very happy in Spain.
Con\ crts contribute tremendously to the remembering of the past and
reincorporation of that era into the collective memory, accepting Islam as a part of their
individual heritage, and encouraging a more visible presence of Islam in modem
Andalucia. Gathering communities of converts in cities of historical Islamic importance
is the most obvious indicator of the impact of the past not only on the decision to convert,
but also on the visibility of their activities.
This environment has led to a blending of local cultures in cities like Granada,
where new generations of Muslims from Nortli Africa mingle with Spanish converts to
Islam, promoting the stability and growth of neighborhoods like the Albaicin. Although it
is growing in an environment of intense tourism and therefore, sometimes intentionally
“exoticized" traditions, the developing identity and culture is no less legitimate for it.
Tourism is keeping members of that culture from being marginalized, while
simultaneously allowing it room to expand and in a certain sense, reclaim an identity for
a lost al-Andalus. This is the prime example of cooperation in the negotiation of the past
in the interest of all parties involved.
The situation of Andalucian Muslims is a counter argument to the essentialist
point of view. As the past is used in the developing culture of Andalucia, we see that
there is no certain, immutable truth to be gathered from history. It only gains relevance in
the context in which it is interpreted.
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